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Abstract
We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is
endowed with a level of political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals
in the society and decides the distribution of resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough
powerful members to win against any alternative coalition that may challenge it, and it needs to
be self-enforcing, in the sense that none of its subcoalitions should be able to secede and become
the new ruling coalition. We first present an axiomatic approach that captures these notions and
determines a (generically) unique ruling coalition. We then construct a simple dynamic game
that encompasses these ideas and prove that the sequentially weakly dominant equilibria (and the
Markovian trembling hand perfect equilibria) of this game coincide with the set of ruling coalitions
of the axiomatic approach. We also show the equivalence of these notions to the core of a related
non-transferable utility cooperative game.
In all cases, the nature of the ruling coalition is determined by the power constraint, which
requires that the ruling coalition be powerful enough, and by the enforcement constraint, which
imposes that no subcoalition of the ruling coalition that commands a majority is self-enforcing.
The key insight that emerges from this characterization is that the coalition is made self-enforcing
precisely by the failure of its winning subcoalitions to be self-enforcing. This is most simply
illustrated by the following simple finding: with simple majority rule, while three-person (or larger)
coalitions can be self-enforcing, two-person coalitions are generically not self-enforcing. Therefore,
the reasoning in this paper suggests that three-person juntas or councils should be more common
than two-person ones. In addition, we provide conditions under which the grand coalition will be
the ruling coalition and conditions under which the most powerful individuals will not be included
in the ruling coalition. We also use this framework to discuss endogenous party formation.
Keywords: coalition formation, collective choice, cooperative game theory, political economy,
self-enforcing coalitions, stability.
JEL Classification: D71, D74, C71.
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1 Introduction
Consider a society in which each individual possesses some amount of military power (“guns”) and
can form a “coalition” with other individuals to fight against the remaining individuals. A group
(coalition) that has suﬃcient power becomes the “ruling coalition”; it determines the allocation of
resources in the society, e.g., how a pie of size 1 will be distributed. A group with more guns can
eliminate (win against) a group with less guns. However, once the elimination has taken place, a
subgroup within the winning group can engage in further rounds of eliminations in order to reduce
the size of the ruling coalition and receive more for each of its members. What types of ruling
coalitions do we expect to form? Will there generally be multiple “equilibrium” or “stable” ruling
coalitions? Will more powerful individuals necessarily obtain more of the resources?
Consider an alternative scenario in which a group of individuals needs to form a committee to
reach a decision. A group that has a (power-weighted) majority can impose the selection of a par-
ticular committee, thus potentially influencing the collective choice. However, once the committee
forms, a subgroup within the committee may sideline some of the members and impose its own
rule. What types of committees do we expect to emerge?
The key feature in both of these examples is that the structure and nature of the ruling coalition
depends not only the power of diﬀerent groups (coalitions), but also whether, once formed, a
particular group will be stable, i.e., self-enforcing. This tension between the power and the stability
of a group is a common feature in many situations where coalitions have to form in order to make
collective choices or determine the allocation of resources.
To investigate these questions systematically, we consider a society consisting of a finite number
of individuals, each with an exogenously given level of political power.1 A group’s power is the sum
of the power of its members. The society has a fixed resource, e.g., a pie of size 1. The distribution
of this resource among the individuals is determined by a (self-enforcing) ruling coalition. For
concreteness, let us suppose that a ruling coalition distributes this resource among its members
according to their political power. A ruling coalition needs to satisfy two requirements. First, it
needs to have total power more than α ∈ [1/2, 1) times the power of all the individuals in society,
so that it is a winning coalition. This is captured by the power constraint. Second, it should have
no subcoalition that would be willing to secede and become the new ruling coalition, so that it is
self-enforcing or stable. This second requirement is captured by the enforcement constraint.
We show that a subcoalition will be self-enforcing if its own winning subcoalitions are not self-
1Throughout, we will work with a society consisting of individuals. Groups that have solved their internal collective
action problem and have well-defined preferences can be considered as equivalent to individuals in this game.
1
enforcing. Intuitively, any subcoalition that is both winning and self-enforcing will secede from the
original coalition and obtain more for its members. Subcoalitions that are not self-enforcing will
prefer not to secede because some of their members will realize that they will be left out of the
ultimate ruling coalition at the next round of secession (elimination).
One of the simple but interesting implications of these interactions is that under majority rule,
ruling coalitions are generically (in a sense to be made precise below) not two-person coalitions,
duumvirates, but can be three-person coalitions, triumvirates.2
Example 1 Consider two agents A and B with powers γA > 0 and γB > 0 and assume that the
decision-making rule requires power-weighted majority (i.e., α = 1/2). If γA > γB, then starting
with a coalition of agents A and B, the agent A will form a majority by himself. Conversely, if
γA < γB, then agent B will form a majority. Thus, “generically” (i.e., as long as γA 6= γB), one of
the members of the two-person coalition can secede and form a subcoalition that is powerful enough
within the original coalition. Since each agent will receive a higher share of the scarce resources in a
coalition that consists of only himself than in a two-person coalition, such a coalition, a duumvirate,
is generically not self-enforcing.
Now, consider a coalition consisting of three agents, A, B and C with powers γA, γB and γC ,
and suppose that γA < γB < γC < γA + γB. Clearly no two-person coalition is self-enforcing.
The lack of self-enforcing subcoalitions of (A,B,C), in turn, implies that (A,B,C) is itself self-
enforcing. To see this, suppose, for example, that a subcoalition of (A,B,C), (A,B) considers
seceding from the original coalition. They can do so since γA + γB > γC . However, we know
from the previous paragraph that the subcoalition (A,B) is itself not self-enforcing, since after
this coalition is established, agent B would secede or “eliminate” A. Anticipating this, agent A
would not support the subcoalition (A,B). A similar argument applies for all other subcoalitions.
Moreover, since agent C is not powerful enough to secede from the original coalition by himself,
the three-person coalition (A,B,C) is self-enforcing. Consequently, a triumvirate can be self-
enforcing and become the ruling coalition. This example also shows that contrary to approaches
with unrestricted side-payments (e.g., Riker, 1962), the ruling coalition will not generally be the
minimal winning coalition (which is (A,B) in this example).
Next, consider a society consisting of four individuals. To illustrate the main ideas, suppose
that we have γA = 3, γB = 4, γC = 5 as well as an additional individual, D, with power γD = 10.
D’s power is insuﬃcient to eliminate the coalition (A,B,C) starting from the initial coalition
2Duumvirate and triumvirate are, respectively, the terms given to two-man and three-man executive bodies in
Ancient Rome.
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(A,B,C,D). Nevertheless, D is stronger than any two of A,B,C. This implies that any three-
person coalition that includes D would not be self-enforcing. Anticipating this, any two of (A,B,C)
would resist D’s oﬀer to secede and eliminate the third. However, (A,B,C) is self-enforcing, thus
the three agents would be happy to eliminate D. Therefore, in this example, the ruling coalition
again consists of three individuals, but interestingly excludes the most powerful individual D.
The most powerful individual is not always eliminated. Consider the society with γA = 2, γB =
4, γC = 7 and γD = 10. In this case, among the three-person coalitions only (B,C,D) is self-
enforcing, thusB,C andD will eliminate the weakest individual, A, and become the ruling coalition.
This example highlights the central roles of the power and the enforcement constraints, which
are illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 1 for a society with three members, (A,B,C). The
two dimensional simplex in the figure represents the powers of the three players (with their sum
normalized to 1 without loss of generality). The shaded area in the first panel is the set of all
coalitions where the subcoalition (A,B) is winning and shows the power constraint, which is parallel
to the AB facet of the simplex.3
The Power Constraint The Enforcement Constraint
Figure 1
The enforcement constraint (for a subcoalition), on the other hand, defines the area, where, if
other players are eliminated, the subcoalition still remains self-enforcing. The second panel depicts
the enforcement constraint for the subcoalition (A,B) when player C is eliminated for a game with
α > 1/2. When |N | = 3, the enforcement constraint defines a cone.4 In the case where α = 1/2,
this cone becomes a straight line perpendicular to the AB facet.
3More generally, if X is a coalition in a society N , then its power constraint corresponds to a hyperplane in a
(|N |− 1)-dimensional simplex, which is parallel to a (|X|− 1)-dimensional facet that contains all vertices from X,
and to a (|N |− |X|− 1)-dimensional facet containing all other vertices.
4More generally, for N > 3 and a proper coalition X, the enforcement constraint defines a quasi-cone, that is, a
union of all segments that connect any point from the (|N |− |X|− 1)-dimensional facet containing all vertices from
N \X to the set of self-enforcing points on the (|X|− 1)-dimensional facet containing all vertices from X.
3
Using this figure, we can determine the distributions of powers for which the subcoalition (A,B)
can emerge as the ruling coalition within (A,B,C). First, it needs to be powerful enough, i.e., lie
in the shaded area in the first panel. Second, it needs to be self-enforcing, i.e., lie in the cone of
enforcement in the second panel. Clearly, when α = 1/2, only a segment of the line where the
powers of A and B are equal can satisfy these constraints, which captures the result in Example
1 that, generically, a two-person coalition cannot become a ruling coalition under majority rule.
More generally, a coalition X can threaten the stability of the grand coalition only if both the
power and the enforcement constraints are satisfied.
Our first major result is that an axiomatic approach to the determination of the ruling coalition
using these two notions, together with two other technical axioms, is suﬃcient to single out a unique
ruling coalition in generic games. We achieve this by defining a mapping from the set of coalitions
of the society into itself that satisfies the above-mentioned axioms. When applied to the entire
society, this mapping gives the ruling coalition.
That this axiomatic approach and the notion of ruling coalition capture important aspects of the
process of coalition formation in political games is reinforced by our analysis of a simple dynamic
game of coalition formation. In particular, we consider a dynamic game where at each stage a
subset of the agents forms a coalition and “eliminates” those outside the coalition. The game ends
when an ultimate ruling coalition, which does not wish to engage in further elimination, emerges.
This ultimate ruling coalition divides the resources among its members according to their power.
The important assumptions here are as follows. First, a player who is eliminated at any point
cannot join future coalitions. This is in line with the motivating examples given above. Second,
there is no possibility of commitment to the division of the resources once the ruling coalition is
established. This no-commitment assumption is natural in political games, since it is impossible to
make commitments or write contracts on future political decisions.5 We establish the existence and
generic uniqueness of sequentially weakly dominant and Markov trembling hand perfect equilibria
of this dynamic game.6 We also show that these equilibrium outcomes coincide with the ruling
coalition derived from the axiomatic approach.
5See Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) for a discussion. Browne and Franklin (1973), Browne and Frendreis (1980),
Schoﬃeld and Laver (1985), and Warwick and Druckman (2001) provide empirical evidence consistent with the notion
that ruling coalitions share resources according to the powers of their members. For example, these papers find a
linear relationship between parties’ shares of parliamentary seats (a proxy for their political power) and their shares
of cabinet positions (“their share of the pie”). Ansolabehere et al. (2005) find a similar relationship between cabinet
positions and voting weights (which are even more closely related to political power in our model) and note that:
“The relationship is so strong and robust that some researchers call it ‘Gamson’s Law’ (after Gamson, 1961, who was
the first to predict such a relationship).”
6 In fact, we establish the more general result that all agenda-setting games (as defined below) have a sequentially
weakly dominant equilibrium and a Markov trembling hand perfect equilibrium.
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Finally, we show that the same solution emerges when we model the process of coalition forma-
tion as a non-transferable utility cooperative game incorporating the notion that only self-enforcing
coalitions can implement allocations that give high payoﬀs to their members.
At some level, it may not be surprising that all these approaches lead to the same result,
since they capture the same salient features of the process of collective decision-making–the power
and the enforcement constraints. Nevertheless, the three approaches model these features in very
diﬀerent ways. We therefore find it reassuring that they all lead to the same conclusions.
Our substantive results relate to the structure of ruling coalitions in this environment:
1. There always exists a ruling coalition and it can be computed by induction on the number of
players.
2. Despite the simplicity of the environment, the ruling coalition can consist of any number of
players, and may include or exclude the most powerful individuals in the society. Conse-
quently, the equilibrium payoﬀ of an individual is not monotonic in his power.7
3. Relatedly, the most powerful individual will be excluded from the ruling coalition, unless he
is powerful enough to win by himself or weak enough so as to be part of smaller self-enforcing
coalitions.
4. Again somewhat paradoxically, an increase in α, i.e., an increase in the degree of superma-
jority, does not necessarily lead to larger ruling coalitions, because it stabilizes otherwise
non-self-enforcing subcoalitions, and as a result, destroys larger coalitions that would have
been self-enforcing for lower values of α.
5. Self-enforcing coalitions are generally “fragile.” For example, under majority rule, i.e.,
α = 1/2, adding or subtracting one player from a self-enforcing coalition makes it non-
self-enforcing.
6. Nevertheless, ruling coalitions are (generically) continuous in the distribution of power across
individuals in the sense that a ruling coalition remains so when the powers of the players are
perturbed by a small amount.
7. Coalitions of certain sizes are more likely to emerge as the ruling coalition. For example, with
majority rule, the ruling coalition cannot (generically) consist of two individuals. Moreover,
7 In terms of our first motivating example, this implies that individuals may wish to “give up their guns” voluntarily
as a “commitment” not to overpower members of certain coalitions and thus be accepted as part of these coalitions.
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again under majority rule, coalitions where members have relatively equal powers are self-
enforcing only when the coalition’s size is 2k − 1 where k is an integer.
Our paper is related to a number of diﬀerent literatures. The first is the social choice litera-
ture. The diﬃculty of determining the social welfare function of a society highlighted by Arrow’s
(im)possibility theorem is related to the fact that the core of the game defined over the allocation of
resources is empty (Arrow, 1951, Austen-Smith and Banks, 1999). Our approach therefore focuses
on a weaker notion than the core, whereby only “self-enforcing” coalitions are allowed to form. Our
paper therefore contributes to the collective choice literature by considering a diﬀerent notion of
aggregating individual preferences and establishes that such aggregation is possible.8
Our work is also related to models of bargaining over resources, both generally and in the
context of political decision-making. In political economy (collective choice) context, two diﬀerent
approaches are worth noting. The first is given by the legislative bargaining models (e.g., Baron
and Ferejohn, 1989, Calvert and Dietz, 1996, Jackson and Boaz, 2002), which characterize the
outcomes of bargaining among a set of players by assuming specific game-forms approximating the
legislative bargaining process in practice. Our approach diﬀers from this strand of the literature,
since we do not impose any specific bargaining structure. The second strand includes Shapley and
Shubik (1954) on power struggles in committees and the paper by Aumann and Kurz (1977), which
looks at the Shapley value of a bargaining game to determine the distribution of resources in the
society.9 Our approach is diﬀerent since we focus on the endogenously-emerging ruling coalition
rather than bargaining among the entire set of agents in a society or in an exogenously-formed
committee.
At a more abstract level, our approach is a contribution to the literature on equilibrium coalition
formation, which combines elements from both cooperative and noncooperative game theory (e.g.,
Peleg, 1980, Hart and Kurz, 1983, Aumann and Myerson, 1988, Greenberg and Weber, 1993,
Chwe, 1994, Bloch, 1996, Ray and Vohra, 1997, 1999, 2001, Seidmann and Winter, 1998, Konishi
and Ray, 2001, Maskin, 2003).10 The most important diﬀerence between our approach and the
8 In this respect, our paper is also related to work on “coalition-proof” Nash equilibrium or rationalizability,
e.g., Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987), Moldovanu (1992), Ambrus (2006). These papers allow deviations by
coalitions in non-cooperative games, but impose that only stable coalitions can form. The main diﬀerence is that
our basic approach is axiomatic or cooperative. We then provide a non-cooperative foundation for our approach,
but do not explicitly use coalition-proofness as a refinement in the non-cooperative game. Another diﬀerence is
that coalition-proof Nash equilibria typically fail to exist (though coalitionally rationalizable outcomes do exist, see
Ambrus, 2006), while we show existence and generic uniqueness of our equilibrium concept in all three approaches
we adopt.
9See also the literature on weighted majority cooperative games, which also model situations in which diﬀerent
individuals have diﬀerent “weights” or “powers,” e.g., Isbell (1956), Peleg (1968), Peleg and Rosenmuller (1992).
10Like some of these papers, our approach can be situated within the “Nash program” since our axiomatic approach
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previous literature on coalition formation is that, motivated by political settings, we assume that
the majority (or supermajority) of the members of the society can impose their will on those
players who are not a part of the majority.11 This feature both changes the nature of the game
and also introduces “negative externalities” as opposed to the positive externalities and free-rider
problems upon which the previous literature focuses (see, for example, Ray and Vohra, 1999, and
Maskin, 2003). A second important diﬀerence is that most of these works assume the possibility
of binding commitments (see again Ray and Vohra, 1997, 1999), while we suppose that players
have no commitment power. In addition, many previous approaches have proposed equilibrium
concepts for cooperative games by restricting the set of coalitions that can block an allocation.
Myerson (1991, ch. 9) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, ch. 14) give comprehensive discussions
of many of these approaches. Our paper is also a contribution to this literature, since we propose a
diﬀerent axiomatic solution concept. To the best of our knowledge, neither the axiomatic approach
nor the specific cooperative game form nor the dynamic game we analyze in this paper have been
considered in the previous literatures on cooperative game theory or coalition formation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic political game and
contains a brief discussion of why it captures certain salient features of political decision-making.
Section 3 provides our axiomatic treatment of this game. It introduces the concept of ruling
coalition and proves its existence and generic uniqueness. Section 4 considers a dynamic game of
coalition formation and a number of equilibrium concepts for this type of extensive-form games. It
then establishes the equivalence between the ruling coalition of Section 3 and the equilibria of this
extensive-form game. Section 5 introduces the cooperative game and establishes the equivalence
between the core allocations of this game and the ruling coalitions. Section 6 contains our main
results on the nature and structure of ruling coalitions in political games. Section 7 considers a
number of extensions such as endogenous party formation and voluntary redistribution of power
within a coalition. Section 8 concludes, and the Appendices contain the proofs not provided in the
text as well as a number of examples to further motivate some of our equilibrium concepts.
is supported by an explicit extensive form game (Nash, 1953). See Serrano (2005) for a recent survey of work on the
Nash program.
11This is a distinctive and general feature of political games. In presidential systems, the political contest is winner-
take-all by design, while in parliamentary systems, parties left out of the governing coalition typically have limited
say over political decisions. The same is a fortiori true in dictatorships.
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2 The Political Game
We are interested in coalition-formation among a finite set of individuals. Let I be a collection
of individuals. We refer to a finite subset N of I as a society.12 The society has some resource
to be distributed among these individuals. Each individual has strictly increasing preferences over
his share of the resource and does not care about how the rest of the resource is distributed. The
distribution of this scarce resource is the key political/collective decision. This abstract formula-
tion is general enough to nest collective decisions over taxes, transfers, public goods or any other
collective decisions.
Our focus is on how diﬀerences in the powers of individuals map into political decisions. We
define a power mapping,
γ : I → R++,
which determines the power of each individual in I (here R++ = R+ \ {0}). In particular, we refer
to γi = γ (i) as the political power of individual i ∈ I. In addition, we denote the set of all possible
power mappings by I∗ and a power mapping γ restricted to some society N ⊂ I by γ|N . For every
set Y denote the set of its non-empty subsets by P (Y ). For any society N ∈ P (I), any X ∈ P (N)
is called a coalition within N , or, for short, a coalition. Throughout, |X| denotes the number of
individuals in the set X ∈ P (N), which is finite in view of the fact that a society N is always finite.
The value
γX =
X
i∈X
γi (1)
is called the power of coalition X (it is well-defined since X is finite). We define γ∅ = 0.
We assume that collective decisions require a (super)majority in terms of power. In particular,
let α ∈ [1/2, 1) be a number characterizing the degree of supermajority necessary for a coalition to
implement any decision. The link between α and supermajority or majority rules is based on the
following definition.
Definition 1 Suppose X and Y are coalitions such that Y ∈ P (X). Coalition Y is winning within
X if
γY > αγX .
Coalition Y ⊂ N is called winning if it is winning within the society N .
12The reason for distinguishing between I and a society N is that, for some of our results, we imagine diﬀerent
subsets of a given collection I as distinct societies and make predictions for the ruling coalitions of these societies.
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Clearly, γY > αγX is equivalent to γY > αγX\Y / (1− α). This illustrates that when α = 1/2
a coalition Y to be winning within X needs to have a majority (within X) and when α > 1/2, it
needs to have a supermajority. Trivially, if Y1 and Y2 are winning within X, then Y1 ∩ Y2 6= ∅.
Given this description, for any society N we define an abstract political game as a triple Γ =
Γ (N, γ|N , α). We refer to Γ as an abstract game to distinguish it from the extensive-form and
cooperative games to be introduced below. In particular, for game Γ, we do not specify a specific
extensive form or strategic interactions, but proceed axiomatically.
We assume that in any political game, the decision regarding the division of the resource will
be made by some ruling coalition. In particular, we postulate that the payoﬀ to each player i is
entirely determined by the ruling coalition X ∈ P (N); we denote this payoﬀ by wi (X). We impose
the following natural restrictions on wi (X).
Payoﬀs The payoﬀ function wi (X) : P (N)→ R for any i ∈ N satisfies the following:
1. ∀i ∈ N, ∀X,Y ∈ P (N) , if i ∈ X and i /∈ Y , then wi (X) > wi (Y ). [This means that
each player prefers to be part of a ruling coalition.]
2. ∀i ∈ N, ∀X,Y ∈ P (N) , if i ∈ X and i ∈ Y then wi (X) > wi (Y ) ⇐⇒ γi/γX > γi/γY
(⇐⇒ γX < γY ). [This means that each player prefers to be in a ruling coalition where
his relative weight is higher.]
3. ∀i ∈ N, ∀X,Y ∈ P (N) , if i /∈ X and i /∈ Y then wi (X) = wi (Y ) = w−i . [This means
that each player is indiﬀerent between two ruling coalitions which he is not part of, while
the last equality defines w−i as the payoﬀ of individual i when he is not a member of the
ruling coalition for future reference.]
The restrictions on wi (X) are quite natural and capture the idea that the player’s payoﬀs depend
positively on the player’s relative strength in the ruling coalition. The most important assumption
introduced so far is that a coalition cannot commit to an arbitrary distribution of resources among
its members. Instead, the allocation of resources is determined by the payoﬀ functions {wi (·)}i∈N .
For example, a coalition consisting of two individuals with powers 1 and 10 cannot commit to share
the resource equally if it becomes the ruling coalition. This assumption will play an important
role in our analysis. We view this as the essence of political-economic decision-making: political
decisions are made by whichever group has political power at the time, and ex ante commitments
to future political decisions are generally not possible (see the discussion and references in footnote
5).
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A specific example of payoﬀ function wi (·) that satisfies the requirements 1—3 results from the
division of a fixed resource between members of the ruling coalition proportional to their power. In
particular, for any X ∈ P (N) let the share obtained by individual i ∈ N of this fixed resource be
wi (X) =
γX∩{i}
γX
=
½ γi
γX
if i ∈ X
0 if i /∈ X . (2)
Evidently, for any X ∈ P (N),
P
i∈N wi (X) = 1.
Since restrictions 1—3 define the division of the resource given the ruling coalition uniquely, the
outcome of any game can be represented by its ruling coalition alone. More formally, fix a society
N ∈ P (I) and let G be the set of all possible games of the form Γ = Γ (N, γ|N , α), i.e.,
G = {(N, γ|N , α) | N ∈ P (I) , γ ∈ I∗, α ∈ [1/2, 1)} .
The outcome mapping, Φ, is a correspondence determining one or several subsets of N ∈ P (I) as
potential ruling coalitions for any game Γ ∈ G, i.e.,
Φ : G ⇒ P (I) .
Our main focus is to characterize the properties of this outcome correspondence. We wish to
understand what types of ruling coalitions will emerge from diﬀerent games, what the size of the
ruling coalition will be, when it will include the more powerful agents, when it will be large relative
to the size of the society (i.e., when it will be “dictatorial,” and when it will be “inclusive”).
We will sometimes impose the following assumption to obtain sharper results (though this
assumption is not necessary for most of our results; see below).
Assumption 1 The power mapping γ ∈ I∗ is generic in the sense that for any X,Y ∈ P (I),
γX = γY implies X = Y . Similarly, we say that coalition N is generic or that numbers {γi}i∈N are
generic if mapping γ|N is generic.
Intuitively, this assumption rules out distributions of powers among individuals such that two
diﬀerent coalitions have exactly the same total power. Notice that this assumption is without
much loss of generality since for any society N the set of vectors {γi}i∈N ∈ R|N |++ that fail to satisfy
Assumption 1 is a set of Lebesgue measure 0 (in fact, it is a union of a finite number of hyperplanes
in R|N |++). For this reason, when a property holds under Assumption 1, we will say that it holds
generically.
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3 Axiomatic Analysis
We begin with an axiomatic analysis. Our approach is to impose some natural restrictions on the
outcome mapping Φ that capture the salient features related to the formation of ruling coalitions.
In particular, we would like the outcome mapping to determine the ruling coalitions for an arbitrary
society. Such a ruling coalition must be winning (according to Definition 1) and self-enforcing, i.e.
must be able to withstand challenges from its subcoalitions that satisfy the enforcement constraint
(i.e., from subcoalitions that are self-enforcing).
Let us fix an abstract game Γ (N, γ|N , α), that is, a power mapping γ : I → R++, a parameter
α ∈ [1/2, 1), and a society N ∈ P (I). Define the correspondence
φ : P (I)⇒ P (I)
by φ (N) = Φ (Γ (N, γ|N , α)) for any N ∈ P (I). We will use φ instead of Φ whenever this causes
no confusion.
Fix an abstract game Γ = (N, γ, α). Then in the spirit of the power and the enforcement
constraints, we adopt the following axioms on φ.
Axiom 1 (Inclusion) For any X ∈ P (N), φ (X) 6= ∅ and if Y ∈ φ (X) then Y ⊂ X.
Axiom 2 (Power) For any X ∈ P (N) and Y ∈ φ (X), γY > αγX .
Axiom 3 (Enforcement) For any X ∈ P (N) and Y ∈ φ (X), Y ∈ φ (Y ).
Axiom 4 (Group Rationality) For any X ∈ P (N), for any Y ∈ φ (X) and any Z ⊂ X such
that γZ > αγX and Z ∈ φ (Z), we have that Z /∈ φ (X) ⇐⇒ γY < γZ .
Motivated by Axiom 3, we define the notion of a self-enforcing coalition as a coalition that
“selects itself”. This notion will be used repeatedly in the rest of the paper.
Definition 2 Coalition X ∈ P (I) is self-enforcing if X ∈ φ (X).
All four axioms are natural. Axiom 1, inclusion, implies that φ maps into subcoalitions of the
coalition it operates upon and that it is defined, i.e., φ (X) 6= ∅. (Note that this does not rule
out φ (X) = {∅}, which is instead ruled out by Axiom 2.) Intuitively, this axiom implies that
new players cannot join a coalition, which is the key feature of the political game we study in
this paper. Axiom 2, the power axiom, requires that the winning coalition lies within X and has
suﬃcient power according to Definition 1. Axiom 3, the enforcement axiom, simply requires that
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any coalition Y ∈ φ (X) (for some X ∈ P (N)) should be self-enforcing according to Definition 2.
Axiom 4 requires that if two coalitions Y,Z ⊂ X are winning and self-enforcing and all players in
Y ∩ Z strictly prefer Y to Z, then Z /∈ φ (X) (i.e., Z cannot be the selected coalition). This is
an individual rationality or “group rationality” type axiom: since α ≥ 1/2, any two winning self-
enforcing coalitions intersect, and we merely require players from such intersection to have rational
preferences between these two coalitions (recall that wi (·) is such that player i prefers a coalition
where his relative power is greater).
The main result of the axiomatic analysis is the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Fix a collection of players I, a power mapping γ, and α ∈ [1/2, 1). Then:
1. There exists a unique mapping φ that satisfies Axioms 1—4. Moreover, when Assumption 1
holds, φ is single-valued.
2. This mapping φ may be obtained by the following inductive procedure:
For any k ∈ N, let Pk (I) = {X ∈ P (I) : |X| = k}. Clearly, P (I) = ∪k∈NPk (I). If X ∈
P1 (I), then let φ (X) = {X}. If φ (Z) has been defined for all Z ∈ Pk0 (I) and for all k0 < k,
then define φ (X) for X ∈ Pk (I) as
φ (X) = argmin
A∈M(X)∪{X}
γA, (3)
where
M (X) = {Z ∈ P (X) \ {X} : γZ > αγX and Z ∈ φ (Z)} . (4)
Proceeding inductively defines φ (X) for all X ∈ P (I).
Proof. We begin with properties of the setM (X) defined in (4) and the mapping φ (X) defined in
(3) (Step 1). We then prove that this mapping φ (X) satisfies Axioms 1—4 (Step 2). We next prove
that this is the unique mapping satisfying Axioms 1—4 (Step 3). Finally, we establish that when 1
holds, φ is a single valued (Step 4). These four steps together prove both parts of the theorem.
Step 1: Note that at each step of the induction procedure,M (X) is well-defined because Z in
(4) satisfies |Z| < |X| and thus φ has already been defined for Z. The argmin set in (3) is also well
defined, because it selects the minimum of a finite number of elements (this number is less than
2|X|; X is a subset of N, which is finite). Non-emptiness follows, since the choice set includes X.
This implies that this procedure uniquely defines some mapping φ (which is uniquely defined, but
not necessarily single-valued).
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Step 2: Take any X ∈ P (I). Axiom 1 is satisfied, because either φ (X) = {X} (if |X| = 1)
or is given by (3), so φ (X) contains only subsets of X and φ (X) 6= ∅. Furthermore, in both cases
φ (X) contains only winning (within X) coalitions, and thus Axiom 2 is satisfied.
To verify that Axiom 3 is satisfied, take any Y ∈ φ (X). Either Y = X or Y ∈M (X). In the
first case, Y ∈ φ (X) = φ (Y ), while in the latter, Y ∈ φ (Y ) by (4).
Finally, Axiom 4 holds trivially when |X| = 1, since there is only one winning coalition. If
|X| > 1, take Y ∈ φ (X) and Z ⊂ X, such that γZ > αγX and Z ∈ φ (Z). By construction of
φ (X), we have that
Y ∈ argmin
A∈M(X)∪{X}
γA.
Note also that Z ∈M (X) ∪ {X} from (4). Then, since
Z /∈ argmin
A∈M(X)∪{X}
γA,
we must have γZ > γY , completing the proof that Axiom 4 holds.
Step 3: Now let us prove that Axioms 1—4 define a unique mapping φ. Suppose that there
are two such mappings: φ and φ0 6= φ. Axioms 1 and 2 immediately imply that if |X| = 1, then
φ (X) = φ0 (X) = {X}. This is because Axiom 2 implies that φ (X) 6= ∅ and Axiom 1 implies
that φ (X) is non-empty; the same applies to φ0 (X). Therefore, there must exist k > 1 such
that for any A with |A| < k, we have φ (A) = φ0 (A), and there exists X ∈ P (I), |X| = k,
such that φ (X) 6= φ0 (X). Without loss of generality, suppose Y ∈ φ (X) and Y /∈ φ0 (X). Take
any Z ∈ φ0 (X) (such Z exists by Axiom 1 and Z 6= Y by hypothesis). We will now derive a
contradiction by showing that Y /∈ φ (X).
We first prove that γZ < γY . If Y = X, then γZ < γY follows immediately from the fact
that Z 6= Y and Z ⊂ X (by Axiom 1). Now, consider the case Y 6= X, which implies |Y | < k (since
Y ⊂ X). By Axioms 2 and 3, Y ∈ φ (X) implies that γY > αγX and Y ∈ φ (Y ); however, since
|Y | < k, we have φ (Y ) = φ0 (Y ) (by the hypothesis that for any A with |A| < k, φ (A) = φ0 (A))
and thus Y ∈ φ0 (Y ). Next, since Z ∈ φ0 (X), γY > αγX , Y ∈ φ0 (Y ) and Y /∈ φ0 (X), Axiom 4
implies that γZ < γY .
Note also that Z ∈ φ0 (X) implies (from Axioms 2 and 3) that γZ > αγX and Z ∈ φ0 (Z).
Moreover, since γZ < γY , we have Z 6= X and therefore |Z| < k (since Z ⊂ X). This again yields
Z ∈ φ (Z) by hypothesis. Since Y ∈ φ (X) , Z ∈ φ (Z) , γZ > αγX , γZ > γY , Axiom 4 implies
that Z ∈ φ (X). Now, since Z ∈ φ (X) , Y ∈ φ (Y ) , γY > αγX , γZ < γY , Axiom 4 implies that
Y /∈ φ (X), yielding a contradiction. This completes the proof that Axioms 1—4 define at most one
mapping.
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Step 4: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. If |X| = 1, then φ (X) = {X} and the conclusion follows.
If |X| > 1, then φ (X) is given by (3); since under Assumption 1 there does not exist Y,Z ∈ P (N)
such that γY = γZ ,
argmin
A∈M(X)∪{X}
γA
must be a singleton. Consequently, for any |X|, φ (X) is a singleton and φ is single-valued. This
completes the proof of Step 4 and of Theorem 1.
At the first glance, Axioms 1—4may appear relatively mild. Nevertheless, they are strong enough
to pin down a unique mapping φ. This reflects the fact that the requirement of self-enforcement
places considerable structure on the problem.
Theorem 1 establishes not only that φ is uniquely defined, but also that when Assumption 1
holds, it is single-valued. In this case, with a slight abuse of notation, we write φ (X) = Y instead
of φ (X) = {Y }.
The fact that φ is determined uniquely implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Take any collection of players I, α ∈ [1/2, 1), and a power mapping γ ∈ I∗. Let φ
be the unique mapping satisfying Axioms 1—4. Coalition N is self-enforcing, that is, N ∈ φ (N), if
and only if there exists no coalition X ⊂ N , X 6= N , which is winning within N and self-enforcing.
Moreover, if N is self-enforcing, then φ (N) = {N}.
Proof. If |N | = 1, this trivially follows from the inductive procedure described in Theorem 1. If
|N | > 1, φ (N) is given by (3). Note that for any Y ∈ M (N), we have γY < γN . Therefore,
N ∈ φ (N) if and only if M (N) = ∅. The definition of M (N), (4), implies that M (N) = ∅ if
and only if there does not exist X ⊂ N , X 6= N , such that γX > αγN and X ∈ φ (X). It follows
from (3) that in this case φ (N) = {N}, proving both claims in Corollary 1.
While Theorem 1 proves the existence and uniqueness of a mapping φ satisfying Axioms 1—4 and
describes the inductive procedure for constructing such mapping, Corollary 1 provides a recursive
method of checking whether a particular coalition is self-enforcing. In particular, the result of
Corollary 1 justifies our geometric representation in the Introduction: a coalition that includes a
winning and self-enforcing subcoalition cannot be self-enforcing, and thus to determine the set of
self-enforcing coalitions, we need to depict the power and enforcement constraints of all proper
subcoalitions.
To illustrate the results of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, let us now return to Example 1.
Example 1 (continued) Again, consider three players A, B and C and suppose that α = 1/2.
For any γA < γB < γC < γA + γB, Assumption 1 is satisfied and φ ({A,B,C}) = {A,B,C}.
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Indeed, in this case, any two-person coalition is stronger than any single person and no coalitions
containing the same number of members have equal power. Furthermore, under Assumption 1,
φ ({A,B}) 6= {A,B}, φ ({A,C}) 6= {A,C} and φ ({B,C}) 6= {B,C}. Therefore, φ ({A,B,C})
cannot be a doubleton, since there exists no two-person coalition X that can satisfy Axiom 3.
Moreover, φ ({A,B,C}) could not be a singleton, since, in view of the fact that γA + γB > γC , no
singleton could satisfy Axiom 2. The only possible value for φ ({A,B,C}) that does not violate
Axioms 2 and 3 is {A,B,C}; it is straightforward to check that Axiom 4 is satisfied, too. We can
also see that φ would not be single valued if Assumption 1 were not satisfied. Suppose, for example,
that γA = γB = γC . In this case, φ ({A,B,C}) = {{A,B} , {B,C} , {A,C}}.
Our next task is to characterize the mapping φ and determine the structure and properties of
ruling coalitions. Before doing this, however, we will present a dynamic game and then a cooperative
game, which will further justify our axiomatic approach.
4 A Dynamic Game of Coalition Formation
In this section, we introduce a dynamic game of coalition formation. We then discuss several
equilibrium concepts for dynamic games of this kind, and show that for reasonable equilibrium
concepts, when Assumption 1 holds there will exist a unique equilibrium coalition, coinciding with
the ruling coalition defined in the previous section.
4.1 The Basic Game Form
Consider an abstract game Γ (N, γ|N , α), that is, a society N ∈ P (I) consisting of a finite number
of individuals, a distribution of power {γi}i∈N , and an institutional rule α ∈ [1/2, 1). We will now
describe a related extensive-form game by Γˆ = Γˆ (N, γ|N , α). This game Γˆ is diﬀerent from Γ, since
it refers to a particular extensive form game (described next).
Let {wi (·)}i∈N be as described in the previous section. Moreover, let ε > 0 be an arbitrarily
small number such that for any i ∈ N and any X,Y ∈ P (N), if wi (X) > wi (Y ), then wi (X) >
wi (Y ) + ε. (Such ε > 0 exists, since N is a finite set.) In particular, for any X ∈ P (N) such that
i ∈ X, we have:
wi (X)− w−i > ε. (5)
Then the extensive form of the game Γˆ (N, γ|N , α) is as follows.
1. At each stage, j = 0, 1, . . ., the game starts with an intermediary coalitions by Nj ⊂ N (with
N0 = N).
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2. Nature randomly picks agenda setter ij,q ∈ Nj for q = 1 (i.e., a member of the coalition Nj).
3. Agenda setter ij,q proposes a coalition Xj,q ∈ P (Nj).
4. All players in Xj,q vote over this proposal; let vj,q (i,X0,q) ∈ {y˜, n˜} be the vote of player
i ∈ Xj,q. Let Yes {Xj,q} be the subset of Xj,q voting in favor of this proposal, i.e.,
Yes {Xj,q} = {i ∈ Xj,q : vj,q (i,X0,q) = y˜} .
Then, if X
i∈Yes{Xj,q}
γi > α
X
i∈Nj
γi,
i.e., if Xj,q is winning within Nj (according to Definition 1), then we proceed to step 5;
otherwise we proceed to step 6.
5. If Xj,q = Nj , then we proceed to step 7 and the game ends. Otherwise players from Nj \Xj,q
are eliminated, players from Xj,q add −ε to their payoﬀ, and the game proceeds to step 1
with Nj+1 = Xj,q (and j increases by 1).
6. If q < |Nj |, then next agenda setter ij,q+1 ∈ Nj is randomly picked by nature such that
ij,q+1 6= ij,r for 1 ≤ r ≤ q (i.e., it is picked among those who have not made a proposal at
stage j) and the game proceeds to step 3 (with q increased by 1). Otherwise, we proceed to
step 7.
7. Nj becomes the ultimate ruling coalition (URC) of this terminal node, and each player i ∈ Nj
adds wi (Nj) to his payoﬀ.
This game form implies that coalitions that emerge during the game form a sequence N0 ⊃
N1 ⊃ . . . ⊃ Nj¯ where j¯ is the number of coalitions (excluding the initial one) that emerges during
the game. Summing over the payoﬀs at each node, the payoﬀ of each player i in game Γˆ is given
by
Ui = wi (Nj¯)− ε
X
1≤j≤j¯
INj (i) , (6)
where IX (·) is the indicator (characteristic) function of set X. This payoﬀ function captures the
idea that individuals’ overall utility in the game is related to their share wi and to the number of
rounds of elimination in which the individual is involved in (the second term in (6)). The number
of players eliminated equals |N |− |Nj¯|, and there is a total of j¯ rounds of elimination.
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With a slight abuse of terminology, we refer to j above as “the round of elimination.” Without
loss of generality, we assume that this is a game of perfect information, in particular after each
time voting takes place each player’s vote become common knowledge; this is convenient because
the players would then share the same information sets.
The arbitrarily small cost ε can be interpreted as a cost of eliminating some of the players
from the coalition or as an organizational cost that individuals have to pay each time a new (even
temporary) coalition is formed. Its role for us is to rule out some “unreasonable” equilibria that
arise in dynamic voting games. Example 5 in Appendix B illustrates that when ε = 0, there exist
equilibria in which the outcome may depend on the behavior of players that will be eliminated for
sure or on the order of moves chosen by Nature.
Note that Γˆ is a finite game; it ends after no more than |N | (|N |+ 1) /2 iterations because
the size of a coalition as a function of the voting stage j defines a decreasing sequence bounded
from below by 0. The coalition that forms after the last elimination is the URC. Consequently,
the extensive-form game Γˆ necessarily has a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE, see below).
However, as the next example shows, there may be many SPNEs and some of those are highly
unintuitive because they involve clear ineﬃciencies in voting (Appendix B presents a more striking
example, Example 4, with multiple Markovian SPNEs).
Example 2 Consider N = {A,B,C,D}, with γA = 3,γB = 4, γC = 5 and γD = 10 (as in Example
1 above), and suppose that α = 1/2. From Theorem 1, it can be seen that φ ({A,B,C,D}) =
{A,B,C}. As we will show later (Theorem 2), there is a Sequentially Weakly Dominant Equilibrium
(which is also a SPNE) in which A, B, or C proposes this coalition, A,B and C vote for in favor of
this coalition, and if D is the first to make a proposal, he proposes {A,B,C,D} which is rejected
by the rest. However, there exists another equilibrium, where all players make random proposals
and everybody votes against any proposal. This is indeed an equilibrium, because no deviation
by a single player can lead to acceptance of any proposal. Consequently, both {A,B,C} and
{A,B,C,D} can emerge as subgame perfect equilibrium URCs, even though the former is not a
reasonable outcome, since A,B, and C have enough votes to eliminate D.
In voting games, equilibria like the one involving {A,B,C,D} as the URC in this example are
typically eliminated by focusing on weakly dominant (or weakly undominated) strategies. However,
this refinement loses its power in dynamic games, since even unreasonable actions are typically
undominated because they may give relatively high payoﬀs when other players choose unreasonable
actions in the future.
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Because these standard equilibrium concepts do not give a satisfactory refinement, in the next
section, we introduce the concept of sequentially weakly dominant equilibrium, which combines the
ideas of backward induction and equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies.13 We then demonstrate
the existence of such equilibria for a broad class of agenda-setting games (defined below).
4.2 Sequentially Weakly Dominant Equilibria
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of Sequential Weakly Dominant Equilibrium (SWDE)
inductively for finite extensive-form games. Consider a general n-person T -stage game, where each
individual can take an action at every stage. Let the action profile of each individual be
ai =
¡
ai1, . . . , a
i
T
¢
for i = 1, . . . , n,
with ait ∈ Ait and ai ∈ Ai =
QT
t=1A
i
t. Let ht = (a1, . . . , at) be the history of play up to stage t (not
including stage t), where as =
¡
a1s, . . . , ans
¢
, so h0 is the history at the beginning of the game, and
let Ht be the set of histories ht for t : 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. We denote the set of all potential histories up
to date t by Ht =
St
s=0Hs. Let t-continuation action profiles be
ai,t =
¡
ait, a
i
t+1, . . . , a
i
T
¢
for i = 1, . . . , n,
with the set of continuation action profiles for player i denoted by Ai,t. Symmetrically, define
t-truncated action profiles as
ai,−t =
¡
ai1, a
i
2, . . . , a
i
t−1
¢
for i = 1, . . . , n,
with the set of t-truncated action profiles for player i denoted by Ai,−t. We also use the standard
notation ai and a−i to denote the action profiles for player i and the action profiles of all other
players (similarly, Ai and A−i). The payoﬀ functions for the players depend only on actions, i.e.,
player i’s payoﬀ is given by
ui
¡
a1, . . . , an
¢
.
We also define the restriction of the payoﬀ function ui to a continuation play
¡
a1,t, . . . , an,t
¢
as
ui
µ
a1,−t, . . . , an,−t
... a1t , . . . , ant
... a1,t+1, . . . , an,t+1
¶
. In words, this function specifies the utility
of player i if players played action profile
¡
a1,−t, . . . , an,−t
¢
up to and including time t− 1, played
the action profile
¡
a1t , . . . , an
¢
at time t and are restricted to the action profile a1,t, . . . , an,t from
13An alternative would have been to modify the game, so that all voting is sequential. It can be proved that the
same results as here apply in this case irrespective of the order in which voting takes place. We prefer the notion
of sequentially weakly dominant equilibrium, since it is more intuitive, creates greater continuity with static voting
games and has applications in a broad class of agenda-setting games (see Appendix B).
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t onwards. Symmetrically, this payoﬀ function can also be read as the utility from continuation
action profile
¡
a1,t+1, . . . , an,t+1
¢
given that up to time t, the play has consisted of the action profileµ
a1,−t, . . . , an,−t
... a1t , . . . , ant
¶
.
A (possibly mixed) strategy for player i is
σi : HT−1 → ∆
¡
Ai
¢
,
where ∆ (X) denotes the set of probability distributions defined over the set X, and for any h ∈ HT
actions in the support of σi (h) are feasible.
Denote the set of strategies for player i by Σi. A t-truncated strategy for player i (corresponding
to strategy σi) specifies plays only until time t (including time t), i.e.,
σi,−t : Ht−1 → ∆
¡
Ai,−t
¢
.
The set of truncated strategies is denoted by Σi,−t. A t-continuation strategy for player i (corre-
sponding to strategy σi) specifies plays only after time t (including time t), i.e.,
σi,t : HT−1 \Ht−2 → ∆ ¡Ai,t¢ ,
where HT−1 \Ht−2 is the set of histories starting at time t.
With a slight abuse of notation, we will also use the same utility function defined over strategies
(as actions) and write
ui
¡
σi,t, σ−i,t | ht−1¢
to denote the continuation payoﬀ to player i after history ht−1 when he uses the
continuation strategy σi,t and other players use σ−i,t. We also use the notation
ui
µ
σ1,t, . . . , σn,t
... σ1,t+1, . . . , σn,t+1 | ht−1
¶
as the payoﬀ from strategy profile
¡
σ1,t, . . . , σn,t
¢
at
time t restricted to the continuation strategy profile
¡
σ1,t+1, . . . , σn,t+1
¢
from t+ 1 onwards, given
history ht−1. Similarly, we use the notation
ui
¡
ai,t, a−i,t | ht−1¢
for the payoﬀ to player i when he chooses the continuation action profile ai,t and others choose a−i,t
given history ht−1. We start by providing the standard definitions of Nash equilibria and subgame
perfect Nash equilibria.
Definition 3 A strategy profile
¡
σˆ1, . . . , σˆn
¢
is a Nash Equilibrium if and only if
ui
¡
σˆi, σˆ−i
¢
≥ ui
¡
σi, σˆ−i
¢
for all σi ∈ Σi and for all i = 1, . . . , n.
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Definition 4 A strategy profile
¡
σˆ1, ..., σˆN
¢
is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium if and only if
ui
¡
σˆi,t, σˆ−i,t | ht−1¢ ≥ ui ¡σi,t, σˆ−i,t | ht−1¢ for all ht−1 ∈ Ht−1,
for all t, for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i and for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Towards introducing weakly dominant strategies, let us take a small digression and consider a
one stage game with actions
¡
a1, ..., an
¢
.
Definition 5 We say that
¡
σˆ1, . . . , σˆn
¢
is a weakly dominant equilibrium if
ui
¡
σˆi, σ−i
¢
≥ ui
¡
σi, σ−i
¢
for all σi ∈ Σi, for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i and for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Naturally, such an equilibrium will often fail to exist. However, when it does exist, it is arguably
a more compelling strategy profile than a strategy profile that is only a Nash equilibrium. Let us
now return to the general T -stage game. A weakly dominant strategy equilibrium in this last stage
of the game is defined similar to Definition 5.
Definition 6 Take any t : 1 ≤ t ≤ T +1. Strategy profile
¡
σˆ1, . . . , σˆn
¢
is a ht−1-sequentially weakly
dominant equilibrium if
¡
σˆ1, . . . , σˆn
¢
is a ht-sequentially weakly dominant equilibrium for any ht
that may occur after ht−1 and
ui
µ
σˆi,t, σ−i,t
... σˆ1,t+1, . . . , σˆN,t+1 | ht−1
¶
≥ ui
µ
σi,t, σˆ−i,t
... σˆ1,t+1, . . . , σˆN,t+1 | ht−1
¶
for all σi,t ∈ Σi,t, for all σ−i,t ∈ Σ−i,t, and for all i = 1, . . . , N .
Definition 6 is inductive, but this induction is finite. Indeed, if history ht−1 leads to a terminal
node, then the first condition is satisfied automatically, because the history will not be recorded any
further. Put diﬀerently, we first hypothesize that there exists a ht-sequentially weakly dominant
equilibrium, impose that it will be played from time t + 1 onwards and then look for a weakly
dominant strategy profile at stage t of the game.
Definition 7 Strategy profile
¡
σˆ1, . . . , σˆn
¢
of a finite extensive-form game is a Sequentially Weakly
Dominant Equilibrium (SWDE) if it is a h0-sequentially weakly dominant equilibrium.
4.3 Characterization of Sequentially Weakly Dominant Equilibria
In this section, we characterize the SWDE of Γˆ. Before doing this, recall that for any extensive-
form game Γˆ = Γˆ (N, γ|N , α), there is a corresponding abstract game Γ = Γ (N, γ|N , α). Recall
that G denotes the set of all such abstract games; we will interchangeably use it to denote the
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set of all extensive form games as described in this section. Theorem 1 established that there is
a unique mapping φ : P (I) ⇒ P (I) that satisfies Axioms 1—4 for any power mapping γ and any
α ∈ [1/2, 1), and moreover, this mapping is single valued when Assumption 1 holds Now, for any
extensive-form game Γˆ = Γˆ (N, γ|N , α) and any equilibrium σ there is a probability distribution
over terminal nodes (because players or Nature may randomize), which gives rise to a probability
distribution of ultimate ruling coalitions (URC); denote the (essential) support of this probability
distribution by Φσ
³
Γˆ (N, γ|N , α)
´
or, for short, by φσ (N). Thus we use the notation Y ∈ φσ (N)
to designate that coalition Y arises as URC with positive probability.
The main result in this section is that under Assumption 1 if σ is any SWDE, then φσ (N) is
entirely concentrated in φ (N). If Assumption 1 does not hold, then for any φ satisfying Axioms
1—4, there exists an SWDE σ such that φσ (N) is entirely concentrated in φ (N).
The next theorem establishes both the existence of a pure strategy SWDE and the above
equivalence result.
Theorem 2 For an extensive-form game Γˆ (N, γ|N , α), denote the corresponding abstract game by
Γ (N, γ|N , α) and let M ∈ φ (N), where φ is the mapping defined in Theorem 1. Then:
1. There exists a pure strategy SWDE where the ultimate ruling coalition (URC) is M and is
reached after at most one stage of elimination with probability 1. The payoﬀ to each i ∈ N
in this SWDE is given by
Ui (N) = wi (X)− εIM (i) I{M 6=N}. (7)
2. If Assumption 1 holds, then in any SWDE (in pure or mixed strategies) the only possible
URC is M (i.e., Pr (φσ (N) = {M}) = 1), it is necessarily reached after at most one stage of
elimination, and payoﬀs are given by (7).
Proof. See Appendix C.
This theorem establishes two important results. First, a pure strategy SWDE exists for any
game Γˆ (N, γ|N , α) and the URC is reached in the first stage of elimination (unless N is itself the
URC). The existence of a pure strategy SWDE for this class of games is a noteworthy fact by
itself, since SWDE is a demanding equilibrium concept and many games will not have such an
equilibrium (see, e.g., Theorem 6). Second, the SWDE URC coincides with φ (N), that is, with the
ruling coalition of Γ (N, γ|N , α), which was derived axiomatically in Section 3. This equivalence
allows us to use the inductive algorithm to determine the URC of the dynamic game. Finally, when
Assumption 1 holds, the URC is the same in all SWDEs.
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While the equivalence between pure strategy SWDE and our axiomatic approach is reassur-
ing, in Appendix A, we introduce the concept of Markov Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium
(MTHPE), which is a slight refinement of the standard Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium. We
then prove that the same results apply with MTHPE as well. In this process, we also establish a
number of more general results about the existence and structure of MTHPE in a broad class of
agenda-setting games, which are of independent interest.
5 A Cooperative Game
In this section, we present a non-transferable utility cooperative game and establish that the
(strong) core of this game coincides with the ruling coalition derived in Section 3.14 This ex-
ercise is useful both because it links our equilibrium concept to those in the cooperative game
theory literature and also because it provides another justification for our axiomatic approach. It
is noteworthy that while the cooperative game theory approach is related to the axiomatic approach
in Section 3, there are also crucial diﬀerences. First, the axiomatic approach involves no strategic
interactions; in contrast (and similar to our noncooperative approach in Section 4), the emphasis
here will be on strategic interactions among players and how there emerges a coalition structure
implementing a payoﬀ allocation such that no other coalition can implement an alternative feasible
allocation making all of its members better oﬀ. Second, the cooperative approach incorporates the
dynamic interactions that were also present in the previous section.
A non-transferable utility cooperative game is represented by Γ˜N = Γ˜ (N, γ|N , α, vN (·)), where
vN : P (N)⇒ R|N |+
is a mapping from the set of coalitions to the set of allocations this coalition can enforce. Notice
that the range of the mapping is not R|N |+ , but P
³
R|N |+
´
, since typically a given coalition can
enforce more than a single vector of utilities.
We define the mapping vN inductively. To do this, we first introduce the concept of strong core
(taking as given the definition of a feasible allocation). We then formally define the set of feasible
allocations. Throughout this section, we assume, without loss of generality, that w−i = 0 for any
i ∈ N (this can always be achieved by a linear transformation).
We denote the core allocations for a non-transferable utility game Γ˜N = Γ˜ (N, γ|N , α, vN (·)) by
C
³
Γ˜N
´
⊂ R|N |+ . Moreover, for any vector x ∈ R
|N |
+ , we denote its ith component by xi. Then:
14By “strong core” we refer to an allocation that cannot be strictly improved upon for all members of a blocking
coalition; see Definition 8. To reduce terminology, refer to this as the “core.”
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Definition 8 A vector x ∈ R|N |+ is in the (strong) core for the game Γ˜N = (N, γ|N , α, vN (·)), i.e.,
x ∈ C
³
Γ˜N
´
, if and only if it is a feasible allocation and there exists no Z ∈ P (N) for which there
is z ∈ vN (Z) such that zi > xi for all i ∈ Z.
Given this definition, we define feasible allocations as follows:
Definition 9 A vector x ∈ R|N |+ is a feasible allocation if either
1. xi = 0 for all i ∈ N , or
2. xi = wi (N) for all i ∈ N , or
3. there exists a subcoalition Y ⊂ N , Y 6= N , such that x|Y ∈ C
³
Γ˜Y
´
, where Γ˜Y =
Γ˜ (Y, γ|Y , α, vY (·)), while xi = 0 for all i /∈ Y .
This definition states that feasible allocations include those where all individuals receive zero
payoﬀ; those in which all individuals in the society share the resource according to their powers
(which could be referred to as the “status quo” allocation); and those where a coalition Y distributes
the resource among its members (according to the payoﬀ functions {wi (·)}i∈N introduced above).
In this latter case, however, not all coalitions are feasible. A coalition Y can only distribute the
resource among its members if it is in the core of the same game restricted to a society identical to
Y . Therefore, this definition is “recursive” in nature; it makes reference to core allocations, defined
in Definition 8.
For a feasible allocation x, let x+ = {i ∈ N : xi > 0}, and x0 = {i ∈ N : xi = 0}. Then define
the mapping vN as follows:
vN (X) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
n
x ∈ R|N |+ : x is feasible
o
if γX > αγNn
x ∈ R|N |+ : xi = 0 ∀ i ∈ N
o
∪n
x ∈ R|N |+ : xi = wi (N) ∀ i ∈ N
o if (1− α) γN ≤ γX ≤ αγN
n
x ∈ R|N |+ : xi = 0 ∀ i ∈ N
o
if γX < (1− α) γN
. (8)
Notice that vN (X) is a subset of R
|N |
+ , meaning that coalition X may enforce multiple allocations.
To motivate Definition 9 and the payoﬀ vector in (8), we can reason as follows. Let us suppose
that the allocation that gives xi = wi (N) to each i ∈ N is the “status quo” allocation. Then, an
α-majority is needed to overrule this allocation, but 1−α votes are suﬃcient to keep the status quo.
That every coalition may enforce allocation xi = 0 for all i ∈ N is a requirement of the standard
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definition of non-transferable utility cooperative games. Another requirement is that when X ⊂ Y ,
we should have vN (X) ⊂ vN (Y ). It is straightforward to check that (8) satisfies both requirements.
The most important feature of this non-transferable utility cooperative game is that even a
winning coalition does not have complete discretion over the allocation; instead, it may only choose
a core allocation for some smaller coalition Y , which is in some sense equivalent to excluding
the players in N \ Y from “sharing the pie” and making players in Y play the cooperative game
Γ˜ (Y, γ|Y , α, vY (·)). If an allocation is not in the core of this reduced game, then it cannot be
imposed, since coalition Y would rather choose a diﬀerent allocation. This feature introduces the
dynamic aspect mentioned above in the context of the cooperative game approach.
Example 3 To illustrate how this game works, consider a society consisting of three individuals
A,B,C with powers (γA, γB, γC) = (3, 4, 5), let α = 1/2. Allocation (3/12, 4/12, 5/12) is a feasible
allocation; to see that it is in the core we need to check whether any coalition that has a majority
of votes can improve for all its members. Take, for instance, coalition {B,C}; it is winning and
therefore can implement any feasible allocation. Both B and C would be better oﬀ if they could
give A nothing and share the resource between themselves. However, allocation (0, 4/9, 5/9) is not
feasible because the core of the game Γ˜
¡{B,C} , γ|{B,C}, α, v{B,C} (·)¢ is a singleton with xB = 0
and xC = 1 (C constitutes a majority alone and can implement this allocation). Allocation (0, 0, 1)
is feasible and may be enforced by coalition {B,C}. But, naturally it makes player B worse oﬀ
than he would have been with the allocation (3/12, 4/12, 5/12). Likewise we can show that no
other coalition can improve for all its members. Therefore, (3/12, 4/12, 5/12) is in the core, and it
is easy to verify that no other feasible vector lies in the core.
Our main result in this section is:
Theorem 3 1. For any Γ˜N = Γ˜ (N, γ|N , α, vN (·)) with vN defined by (8), the core C
³
Γ˜N
´
is
nonempty.
2. Take abstract game Γ (N, γ|N , α) and the outcome set φ (N) corresponding to it (characterized
in Theorem 1). Then, for any x ∈ C
³
Γ˜N
´
, x+ ∈ φ (N), and for i ∈ x+, xi (i) = wi (x+); vice
versa, for any M ∈ φ (N) there exists a unique x ∈ C
³
Γ˜N
´
such that x+ ∈ φ (N) (so there
is a one-to-one correspondence between core allocations and equilibrium ruling coalitions).
Moreover, when Assumption 1 holds, the core C
³
Γ˜N
´
is a singleton and x+ = φ (N), where
x the unique element of the core.
Proof. See Appendix C.
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This theorem therefore establishes the equivalence between the axiomatic approach in Section
3, the dynamic game in the previous section, and the cooperative game in this section, even though
each of these three diﬀerent approaches models the determination of the ruling coalition in a
very diﬀerent manner. The main idea underlying this result is that only self-enforcing and winning
coalitions can implement payoﬀ vectors that are attractive for their own members. In the framework
of non-transferable utility cooperative games, this is captured by two features: first, only winning
coalitions can implement feasible payoﬀ vectors (Definition 8); second, in addition to zero payoﬀs
and status quo allocation, only payoﬀ vectors that correspond to core allocations for a smaller game
are feasible (Definition 9). These two features introduce the power and enforcement constraints that
were also essential in the axiomatic and the dynamic game approaches. In view of this, the finding
that the set of core allocations here correspond to the ruling coalitions is perhaps not surprising,
though still reassuring.
6 The Structure of Ruling Coalitions
In this section, we present several results on the structure of ruling coalitions. Given the equivalence
results in the previous two sections, without loss of generality we focus on ruling coalitions of
abstract games Γ = Γ (N, γ|N , α). In addition to Assumption 1, consider:
Assumption 2 For no X,Y ∈ P (I) such that X ⊂ Y the equality γY = αγX is satisfied.
Essentially, Assumption 2 guarantees that a small perturbation of a non-winning coalition Y
does not make it winning. Similar to Assumption 1, this assumption fails only in a set of Lebesgue
measure 0. Together, Assumptions 1 and 2 simplify the analysis in this section, and we assume
that they both hold throughout the section, without explicitly stating this in every proposition.
6.1 Robustness
We start with the result that the set of self-enforcing coalitions is open (in the standard topology);
this is not only interesting per se but will facilitate further proofs. Fix a society N and α ∈ [1/2, 1)
and consider the set of power mappings restricted to society N , γ|N . Clearly, each mapping is
given by a |N |-dimensional vector {γi}i∈N ⊂ R|N |++. Denote the subset of vectors {γi}i∈N that satisfy
Assumptions 1 and 2 by A (N), the subset of A (N) for which Φ
¡
N, {γi}i∈N , α
¢
= N (i.e., the subset
of power distributions for which coalition N is stable) by S (N) and let N (N) = A (N) \S (N).
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Theorem 4 1. The set of power allocations that satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, A (N), its subsets
for which coalition N is self-enforcing, S (N), and its subsets for which coalition N is not
self-enforcing, N (N), are open sets in R|N |++. The set A (N) is also dense in R
|N |
++.
2. Each connected component of A (N) lies entirely within either S (N) or N (N).
Proof. (Part 1) The set A (N) may be obtained from R|N |++ by subtracting a finite number of
hyperplanes given by equations γX = γY for all X,Y ∈ P (N) such that X 6= Y and by equations
γY = αγX for all X,Y ∈ P (N) such that X ⊂ Y . These hyperplanes are closed sets (in the
standard topology of R|N |++), hence, a small perturbation of powers of a generic point preserves this
property (genericity). This ensures that A (N) is an open set; it is dense because hyperplanes have
dimension lower than |N |. The proofs for S (N) and N (N) are by induction. The base follows
immediately since S (N) = R++ and N (N) = ∅ are open sets. Now suppose that we have proved
this result for all k < |N |. For any distribution of powers {γi}i∈N , N is self-enforcing if and
only if there are no proper winning self-enforcing coalitions within N . Now take some small (in
sup-metric) perturbation of powers {γ0i}i∈N . If this perturbation is small, then the set of winning
coalitions is the same, and, by induction, the set of proper self-enforcing coalitions is the same as
well. Therefore, the perturbed coalition {γ0i} is self-enforcing if and only if the initial coalition with
powers {γi} is self-enforcing; which completes the induction step.
(Part 2) Take any connected component A ⊂ A (N). Both S (N)∩A and N (N)∩A are open
in A in the topology induced by A (N) (and, in turn, by R|N |++) by definition of induced topology.
Also, (S (N) ∩A) ∩ (N (N) ∩A) = ∅ and (S (N) ∩A) ∪ (N (N) ∩A) = A, which, given that A
is connected, implies that either S (N) ∩ A or N (N) ∩ A is empty. Hence, A lies either entirely
within S (N) or N (N). This completes the proof.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 4 is that if the distribution of powers in two diﬀerent
games are “close,” then these two games will have the same ruling coalition. To state and prove
this proposition, endow the set of mappings γ, I∗, with the sup-metric, with distance given by
ρ(γ, γ0) = supi∈I∗ |γi − γ0i|. Define a δ-neighborhood of γ as {γ0 ∈ I∗ : ρ (γ, γ0) < δ}.
Proposition 1 Fix a society N , α ∈ [1/2, 1) and a power mapping γ : N → R++. Then:
1. There exists δ > 0 such that if γ0 : N → R++ lies within δ-neighborhood of γ, then
Φ (N, γ, α) = Φ (N, γ0, α).
2. There exists δ0 > 0 such that if α0 ∈ [1/2, 1) satisfies |α0 − α| < δ0, then Φ (N, γ, α) =
Φ (N, γ, α0).
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Proof. We prove this Proposition by induction. IfN = 1, it is trivial: for any γ and α, Φ (N, γ, α) =
{N}. Now assume that we have proved this result for all societies with |N | < n; take any society
N with |N | = n. We take advantage of the inductive procedure for determining Φ (N, γ, α), which
is described in Theorem 1. Indeed, since we assume that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then the set
M (N), as defined by (4), is the same for Γ (N, γ, α), Γ (N, γ0, α), and Γ (N, γ, α0), provided that
δ is suﬃciently small (we use induction to get that self-enforcing coalitions remain self-enforcing
after perturbation). Moreover, if δ is small, then γX > γY is equivalent to γ0X > γ
0
Y . Therefore,
(3) implies that Φ (N, γ, α) = Φ (N, γ0, α) = Φ (N, γ, α0). This completes the proof.
In addition, we prove that the mapping φ is “robust” in the sense that the inclusion of suﬃciently
weak player(s) does not change the ruling coalition in a society.
Proposition 2 Consider a game Γ = Γ (N ∪M,γ|N∪M , α) with arbitrary disjoint finite sets M
and N . Then exists δ > 0 such that for all M such that γM < δ, φ (N) = φ (N ∪M).
Proof. The proof is by induction. Let |N | = n. For n = 1 the result follows straightforwardly.
Suppose next that the result is true for n. If δ is small enough, then φ (N) is winning withinM∪N ;
we also know that it is self-enforcing. Thus we only need to verify that there exists no X ⊂ N ∪M
such that φ (X) = X, i.e., X that is self-enforcing, winning in N ∪M and has γX < γφ(N). To
obtain a contradiction, assume the contrary, i.e. that the minimal winning self-enforcing coalition
X ∈ P (M ∪N) does not coincide with φ (N). Consider its part that lies within N , X ∩ N . By
definition, γN ≥ γφ(N) > γX ≥ γX∩N , where the strict inequality follows by hypothesis. This string
of inequalities implies that X ∩ N is a proper subset of N , thus must have fewer elements than
n. Then, by induction, for small enough δ, φ (X ∩N) = φ (X) = X (since X is self-enforcing).
However, φ (X ∩N) ⊂ N , and thus X ⊂ N . Therefore, X is self-enforcing and winning within
N (since it is winning within M ∪N). This implies that γφ(N) ≤ γX (since φ (N) is the minimal
self-enforcing coalition that is winning within N). But this contradicts the inequality γφ(N) > γX
and implies that the hypothesis is true for n+ 1. This completes the proof.
Essentially, Proposition 2 says that mapping φ is “continuous at zero”, in the sense that adding
a group of agents with limited powers to the society (which is equivalent to changing their power
from 0 to small positive values) does not change the ruling coalition. Indeed, while we did not
define φ for societies where some of the members have 0 power, it is natural to think that they do
not have an impact in votings or in resource allocation. Here, we prove that agents (or groups of
agents) with suﬃciently small power have no impact either.
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6.2 Size of Ruling Coalitions
The next question we address is how many players may be included in the ruling coalition. We
start with the case of majority rule and then consider supermajority rules. These result implies
that relatively little can be said about the structure of ruling coalitions without putting some more
structure.
Proposition 3 If α = 1/2, the following statements are true.
1. For any n and m such that 1 ≤ m ≤ n, m 6= 2, there exists a set of players N , |N | = n, and
a generic mapping of powers γ|N such that |φ (N)| = m. In particular, for any m 6= 2 there
exists a self-enforcing coalition of size m.
2. There is no self-enforcing coalition of size 2.
Proof. (Part 1) Given Proposition 2, it is suﬃcient to show that there is a self-enforcing coalition
M of size m (then adding n −m players with negligible powers to form coalition N would yield
φ (N) = φ (M) = M). Let i ∈ M = {1, . . . ,m} be the set of players. If m = 1, the statement is
trivial. Fix m > 2 and construct the following sequence recursively: γ1 = 2, γk >
Pk−1
j=1 γj for all
k = 2, 3, . . . ,m − 1, γm =
Pm−1
j=1 γj − 1. It is straightforward to check that numbers {γi}i∈M are
generic.
Let us check that no proper winning coalition within M is self-enforcing. Take any proper
winning coalition X; it is straightforward to check that |X| ≥ 2, for no single player forms a
winning coalition. Coalition X either includes γm or not. If it includes γm and is not proper, it
excludes some player k with k < m; his power γk ≥ 2 by construction. Hence, γm =
Pm−1
j=1 γj−1 >Pm−1
j=1 γj − γk ≥ γX\{m}, which means that γm is stronger than the rest, and thus coalition M is
non-self-enforcing. If it does not include γm, then take the strongest player in X; suppose it is k,
k ≤ m− 1. However, by construction he is stronger than all other players in X, and thus X is not
self-enforcing. This proves that M is self-enforcing.
(Part 2) If |X| = 2 and Assumption 1 holds, then one of the players (denote him i) is stronger
than the other one, and thus {i} is a winning self-enforcing coalition. But then, by Corollary 1, X
cannot be self-enforcing.
The first part of Proposition 3 may be generalized for α > 1/2. Moreover, in that case, any size
(including 2) of self-enforcing coalitions is possible.
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Proposition 4 Take any collection of players I, any power mapping γ : I → R++, and suppose
that α > 1/2. Then for any n and any m such that 1 ≤ m ≤ n there exists a set of players
N , |N | = n, with powers γ|N such that |φ (N)| = m. In particular, there exists a self-enforcing
coalition of size m.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Part 1 of Proposition 3. The recursive sequence should be
constructed as follows: γ1 = 2, γk > α
Pk−1
j=1 γj for all k = 2, 3, . . . ,m− 1, γm = α
Pm−1
j=1 γj − 1.
These results show that one can say relatively little about the size and composition of the
equilibrium ruling coalition without taking the specifics of the distribution of powers among the
individuals into consideration. For the case when power distribution is nearly uniform, we have the
following sequence of results.
Proposition 5 Fix a society N , α ∈ [1/2, 1) and a power mapping γ : N → R++. Then:
1. Let α = 1/2 and suppose that for any two coalitions X,Y ∈ P (N) such that |X| > |Y | we
have γX > γY (i.e., larger coalitions have greater power). Then φ (N) = N if and only if
|N | = km where km = 2m − 1, m ∈ Z.
2. Let α = 1/2. Consider set of players I = N and define
γn = γ (n) =
2n − 1
2n
(9)
for each n ∈ N. Let Nn = {1, . . . , n} ∈ P (I). Then in the game
Γˆ (Nn, γ|Nn , α) the equilibrium ruling coalition has size m (i.e. |φ (Nk)| = m) where m =
max
©
z ∈ Nn | z = 2k − 1 for k ∈ N
ª
.
3. For the condition ∀X,Y ∈ P (N) : |X| > |Y | ⇒ γX > γY to hold, it is suﬃcient to require
that there exists some λ > 0 such that
|N |X
j=1
¯¯¯γj
λ
− 1
¯¯¯
< 1. (10)
4. More generally, suppose α ∈ [1/2, 1) and suppose that γ is such that for any two coalitions
X ⊂ Y ⊂ N such that |X| > α |Y | (|X| < α |Y | , resp.) we have γX > αγY (γX < αγY ,
resp.). Then φ (N) = N if and only if |N | = km,α where k1,α = 1 and km,α =
h
km−1,α
α
i
+ 1
for m > 1, where [z] denotes the integer part of z
5. For any mapping γ|N that satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2 there exists δ > 0 such that
maxi,j∈N
γi
γj
< 1 + δ implies that |X| > α |Y | (|X| < α |Y | , resp.) whenever γX > αγY
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(γX < αγY , resp.). In particular, coalition X ∈ P (N) is self-enforcing if and only if
|X| = km,α for some m (where km,α is defined in Part 3).
Proof. (Part 1) Let us check that the condition in Part 4 is satisfied. Take any X ⊂ Y ⊂ N .
Obviously, |X| ≷ 12 |Y | ⇐⇒ |X| ≷ |Y \X| =⇒ γX ≷ γY \X ⇐⇒ γX ≷ 12γY . Now let us check
that km’s in Part 1 and in Part 4 are equal. Indeed, k1 = 21 − 1 = 1 and if km−1 = 2m−1 − 1 then
km = 2m − 1 = [2km−1] + 1. By induction, we get that Part 1 follows as a special case of Part 4.
(Part 2) The statement follows immediately from Part 1.
(Part 3) Assume the contrary, i.e., that for some X,Y ⊂ N such that |X| > |Y | we have
γX ≤ γY . Then the same inequalities hold for X 0 = X \ (X ∩ Y ) and Y 0 = Y \ (X ∩ Y ), which do
not intersect. Mathematically, X
j∈X0
γj ≤
X
j∈Y 0
γj .
This implies X
j∈X0
γj
λ
≤
X
j∈Y 0
γj
λ
and thus X
j∈X0
³γj
λ
− 1
´
+
¯¯
X 0
¯¯
≤
X
j∈Y 0
³γj
λ
− 1
´
+
¯¯
Y 0
¯¯
.
Rearranging, we have
1 ≤
¯¯
X 0
¯¯
−
¯¯
Y 0
¯¯
≤
X
j∈Y 0
³γj
λ
− 1
´
−
X
j∈X0
³γj
λ
− 1
´
≤
X
j∈X0∪Y 0
¯¯¯γj
λ
− 1
¯¯¯
.
However, X 0 and Y 0 do not intersect, and therefore this violates (10). This contradiction completes
the proof of Part 3.
(Part 4) The proof is by induction. The base is trivial: a one-player coalition is self-enforcing,
and |N | = k1 = 1. Now assume the claim has been proved for all q < |N |, let us prove it for
q = |N |. If |N | = km for some m, then any winning (within N) coalition X must have size at
least α
³h
km−1
α
i
+ 1
´
> αkm−1α = km−1 (if it has smaller size then γX < αγN). By induction, all
such coalitions are not self-enforcing, and this means that the grand coalition is self-enforcing. If
|N | 6= km for any m, then take m such that km−1 < |N | < km. Now take the coalition of the
strongest km−1 individuals. This coalition is self-enforcing by induction. It is also winning (this
follows since km−1 = α
km−1
α ≥ α
h
km−1
α
i
= α (km − 1) ≥ α |N |, which means that this coalition
would have at least α share of power if all individuals had equal power, but since this is the
strongest km−1 individuals, the inequality will be strict). Therefore, there exists a self-enforcing
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winning coalition, diﬀerent from the grand coalition. This implies that the grand coalition is not
self-enforcing, completing the proof.
(Part 5) This follows immediately from Part 4 and Proposition 4.
Consequently, while it is impossible to make any general claims about the size of coalitions
without specifying more details about the distribution of power within the society, we are able
to provide a tight characterization of the structure of the ruling coalition when individuals are
relatively similar in terms of their power.
6.3 Fragility of Self-Enforcing Coalitions
Here, we show that while the structure of ruling coalitions is robust to small changes in the dis-
tribution of power within the society, it may be fragile to more sizeable shocks, such as adding or
losing a member of the ruling coalition. The next proposition establishes that under simple ma-
jority rule, self-enforcing coalitions are fragile in the sense that addition or subtraction of a single
agent from these coalitions or, more generally, a union of two disjoint self-enforcing coalitions leads
to a non-self enforcing coalition.
Proposition 6 Suppose α = 1/2 and fix a power mapping γ : I → R++. Then:
1. If coalitions X and Y such that X ∩ Y = ∅ are both self-enforcing, then coalition X ∪ Y is
not.
2. If X is a self-enforcing coalition, then X ∪ {i} for i /∈ X and X \ {i} for i ∈ X are not
self-enforcing.
Proof. (Part 1) Either X is stronger than Y or vice versa. The stronger of the two is a winning
self-enforcing coalition that is not equal to X ∪ Y . This implies that X ∪ Y is not the minimal
winning self-enforcing coalition, and so it is not the ruling coalition in X ∪ Y .
(Part 2) For the case of adding, it follows directly from Part 1, since coalition of one player is
always self-enforcing. For the case of deleting: suppose that it is wrong, and the coalition is self-
enforcing. Then, by Part 1, adding this person back will result in an non-self-enforcing coalition.
This is a contradiction which completes the proof of Part 2.
6.4 Power and the Structure of Ruling Coalitions
One might expect that an increase in α–the supermajority requirement–may increase the size
of the ruling coalition and also turn otherwise non-self-enforcing coalitions into self-enforcing ones
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(e.g., coalition (3, 4) is not self-enforcing when α = 1/2, but becomes self-enforcing when α > 4/7).
Nevertheless, this is generally not the case.
Proposition 7 An increase in α may reduce the size of the ruling coalition. That is, there exists
a society N , a power mapping γ and α, α0 ∈ [1/2, 1), such that α0 > α but for all X ∈ Φ (N, γ, α)
and X 0 ∈ Φ (N, γ, α0), |X| > |X 0| and γX > γX0.
Proof. The following example is suﬃcient to establish this result: coalition (3, 4, 5) is self-enforcing
when α = 1/2, but is not self-enforcing when 4/7 < α < 7/12, because (3, 4) is now a self-enforcing
and winning subcoalition.
Intuitively, higher α turns certain coalitions that were otherwise non-self-enforcing into self-
enforcing coalitions as expected, but this implies that larger coalitions are now less likely to be
self-enforcing and less likely to emerge as the ruling coalition. This, in turn, makes larger coalitions
more stable. This proposition therefore establishes that greater power or “agreement” requirements
in the form of supermajority rules do not necessarily lead to larger ruling coalitions.
The next proposition establishes the complementary result that an increase in the power of an
individual can remove him out of the ruling coalition. To state this result, let us use the notation
j ∈ Φ (N, γ, α) to denote a situation in which X ∈ Φ (N, γ, α) such that j ∈ X.
Proposition 8 There exist a society N , α ∈ [1/2, 1), two mappings γ, γ0 : N → R++ satisfying
γi = γ0i for all i 6= j, γj < γ0j such that j ∈ Φ (N, γ, α), but j /∈ Φ (N, γ0, α). Moreover, this
remains correct if we require j to be the strongest individual in both cases, i.e. γ0i = γi < γj < γ
0
j
for all i 6= j.
Proof. Take α = 1/2, five players A,B,C,D,E with γA = γ0A = 2, γB = γ
0
B = 10, γC = γ
0
C = 15,
γD = γ0D = 20, γE = 21, and γ
0
E = 40. Then Φ (N, γ, α) = {A,D,E}, while Φ (N, γ0, α) =
{B,C,D}, so player E, who is the most powerful player in both cases, belongs to Φ (N, γ, α) but
not to Φ (N, γ0, α).
Proposition 8 shows that being more powerful may be a disadvantage, even for the most powerful
player. This raises the question of when the most powerful player will be part of the ruling coalition.
This question is addressed in the next proposition.
Proposition 9 Suppose that N = {1, . . . , |N |}, α ∈ [1/2, 1), and γ|N is such that γ1, . . . , γ|N | is an
increasing sequence. Consider the game Γ (N, γ|N , α). If γ|N | ∈
³
α
1−α
P|N |−1
j=2 γj ,
α
1−α
P|N |−1
j=1 γj
´
,
then either coalition N is self-enforcing or the most powerful individual, |N |, is not a part of the
ruling coalition.
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Proof. Inequality γ|N | > α1−α
Pn−1
j=2 γj implies that any coalition that includes |N |, but excludes
even the weakest player will not be self-enforcing. The inequality γ|N | < α1−α
Pn−1
j=2 γj implies that
player |N | does not form a winning coalition by himself. Therefore, either N is self-enforcing or
φ (N) does not include the strongest player. This completes the proof.
6.5 Self-Enforcing Coalitions When N = 3
In this subsection, we illustrate the structure of equilibrium ruling coalitions more explicitly for the
case N = 3. This representation also shows that even in this most simple environment, an increase
in α might make it less likely that larger coalitions emerge as the ruling coalition.
We use the geometric representation already introduced in the Introduction. Generally, the
geometric representation of an N player game uses the (N − 1)-dimensional simplex to depict all
potential power allocations, which are represented by points (γ1, ..., γN) with γi ≥ 0 and
P
i γi = 1
(where this last equality is without loss of generality). As discussed in the Introduction, there
are two kinds of constraints that define the set of all self-enforcing coalitions: “power constraints”nP
j∈K γj ≥ α
o
which are always parallel to be respective (K−1)-dimensional facet, and “enforce-
ment constraints,” which correspond to (quasi-)cones.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the set of self-enforcing coalitions as α changes from 1/2 (simple
majority) to 1 (unanimous voting rule) for the case with N = 3. The set of power configurations
such that the grand coalition is the ruling coalition is shaded. The first panel corresponds to the
case α = 1/2. For any point (γ1, γ2, γ3) outside the shaded triangle, there is some member i who
has power γi > 1/2. The second panel corresponds to the case when α becomes larger than 1/2; it
demonstrates that the set of self-enforcing coalitions, while remaining a union of a finite number of
convex sets, may have non-convex connected components. Interestingly, the “central coalitions”,
i.e. those close to (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), which were self-enforcing when α = 1/2, cease to be self-enforcing
when α increases. The reason is that with α > 1/2, there is a range of 2-person self-enforcing
coalitions; the fact that they are self-enforcing makes 3-person coalitions containing them non-
self-enforcing (Figure 2). When α is large enough, but still less than 2/3, the set of self-enforcing
coalitions coalition set becomes a union of a finite number of convex connected components (namely,
of three trapezoids). When α = 2/3, the trapezoids become triangles.
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α = 12
1
2 < α <
2
3 α >
2
3
Figure 2
The third panel shows that when α > 2/3 (and this generalizes straightforwardly to α >
(N − 1) /N for an arbitrary N), there is a new part to the self-enforcing coalition set around. This
demonstrates that the self-enforcing coalition set is non-monotonic in α: the coalitions close to
(1/3, 1/3, 1/3) are self-enforcing again. This new set of self-enforcing coalitions increases with α
and eventually grows to cover all points when α approaches 1, but for all α such that 2/3 < α < 1,
it is a joint of four triangles as shown in the third panel. Obviously, points in the “middle” set
of self-enforcing coalitions are more stable than other self-enforcing coalitions: even if there is a
random shock that eliminates some players, the remainder is a self-enforcing coalition.
7 Extensions
In this section, we discuss two extensions of our basic framework. First, we show how this framework
can be applied for thinking about endogenous party formation, and second we show how reallocation
of power within a group can be beneficial for all group members (which is a form of “giving up the
guns” mentioned in footnote 7).
7.1 Party Formation
If there were no enforcement constraints, the minimal winning coalition would always emerge as
the ruling coalition.15 However, we have seen that the ultimate ruling coalition is not necessarily
the minimal winning coalition. This is because the minimal winning coalition might not be self-
enforcing (e.g., as is coalition (3, 4) in (3, 4, 5)), and thus cannot form a ruling coalition. What
prevents the formation of this coalition is the fact that its members do not to trust each other. If
somehow they could enter into binding agreements, the minimum winning coalition could emerge
15X ∈ P (N) is a minimal winning coalition within N if γX > αγN and γX ≤ γZ for any Z ∈ P (N) such that
γZ > αγN .
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as the ultimate willing coalition. In this subsection, we think of party formation as a way of forming
binding agreements among a subset of agents. In particular, we allow some of the players to form
permanent alliances, eﬀectively merging into a single member with combined power. Another way
is to allow members of a coalition freely transfer (shares of) their power to each other to make the
coalition self-enforcing, which is explored in the next subsection.
More specifically, consider the party-formation game Γˆ0, which is identical to the game Γˆ in
Section 4, except that there is now a first stage before Γˆ is played, in which a subset of agents can
form a binding coalition, a “party,” and this party plays the game as a single agent. The result
of this party-formation game will be that the minimal winning coalition will form a party and will
guarantee power for its members.
Proposition 10 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and let X be the minimal winning coalition, i.e.,
X = {Z ∈ P (X) : γZ > αγN and @Y with γY ∈ (αγN , γZ)}. Then, in the party-formation game
Γˆ0 (N, γ|N , α), the URC is X.
Proof. The proof follows the steps of the proof of Theorem 2 and is omitted.
7.2 Power Exchange
We have seen that individuals can be made worse oﬀ by having more power. This naturally raises
the question of whether individuals would like to relinquish their power (for example, give up their
guns in the context of fighting preceding political decision-making). We now investigate this issue
under the assumption that α = 1/2. Our main result is that any minimal winning coalition X can
redistribute power in such a way that it becomes self-enforcing, and each member of X is better
oﬀ than he would have been without power redistribution.
The next result demonstrates that when the size of the minimal winning coalition exceeds 2
(i.e., if |X| ≥ 3), X can redistribute power to become self-enforcing, with each member becoming
strictly better oﬀ than they would have been in the initial allocation.
Theorem 5 Suppose that α = 1/2, the grand coalition N is ruling, and X is a minimal winning
coalition in N . Then, provided that |X| ≥ 3, there exists a redistribution of power among the
members of X such that X becomes the ruling coalition and implements a payoﬀ bwi for each i ∈ N ,
such that bwi > wi (N) for all i ∈ X.
Proof. We will make our argument in terms of agents’ power (γ1, ..., γN ) and then use our as-
sumptions about payoﬀ functions to prove the claim. Without loss of generality, assume thatP
i∈N γi = 1, and denote W =
P
i∈N\X γi. We will prove the claim in the theorem in two steps.
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(Step 1) Suppose that there exists k ∈ X such that coalition X \ {k} is not self-enforcing.
Consider the parametrized family (γβi )i∈X of distributions of power in coalition X : γ
β
k =
γk +Wβ and
γβi = γi +
γiP
i∈X\{k} γi
W (1− β) .
When β = 1, k alone forms a winning coalition, since
γk +W ≥
X
i∈X\{k}
γi.
(Otherwise, coalition X \ {k} is winning which contradicts the minimality of X.) We claim that
there exists some β such that with
³
γβi
´
i∈X
X becomes a self-enforcing coalition and since it is the
minimal winning coalition, it becomes the ruling coalition.
Let β0 be determined by
γk +Wβ0 =
X
i∈X\{k}
γi +W (1− β0) .
(Such β0 exists since γk <
P
i∈N\{k} γi by assumption). Since 0 < β0 < 1, γ
β0
i > γi for any i ∈ X.
Now let ζ be a positive number such that
γβ0k − ζ <
X
i∈X\{k}
µ
γβ0i +
ζ
|X|− 1
¶
γβ0k − ζ >
X
i∈X\{k,j}
µ
γβ0i +
ζ
|X|− 1
¶
for any j ∈ X \ {k}. Then coalition
µbγk = γβ0k − ζ,³bγi = γβ0i + ζ|X|−1´i6=k
¶
is a ruling coalition,
implementing a payoﬀ vector with higher payoﬀs for each member of the minimal winning coalition.
(Step 2) Now suppose that for any k ∈ X, coalition X \ {k} is self-enforcing. Then any
coalition X \ {k, j} is not self-enforcing (adding one player to a self-enforcing coalition makes it
non-self-enforcing). Assume without loss of generality that γ1 = maxi∈X γi, and γM = mini∈X γi.
Coalition X \ {1,M} is not self-enforcing. Therefore, there exists a coalition Y ⊂ X \ {1,M} such
that Y is self-enforcing and
γ (Y ) > γ ((X \ {1,M}) \ Y ) .
Since γ (X \ {1})− γ (X \ {1,M}) = γM , if we divide γM proportionally between the members of
Y coalition, the resulting new coalition Y 0 will make coalition X \ {1,M} not self-enforcing andbγi > γi for all i ∈ X.
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Now using the result from Step 1, it suﬃces to show that
γ1 + (W − γM) >
X
i∈X\{1,M}
γi + γM =
X
i∈X\{1}
γi. (11)
(This would imply that γ1+(W − γM) >
P
i∈X\{1,j} γi+ γM for any j ∈ {2, . . . ,M}, which would
mean that 1 cannot form a self-enforcing coalition with less than all M − 1 members of X \ {1}.)
Inequality (11) is equivalent to
1− γM > 2
X
i∈X\{1}
γi
(we add
P
i∈X\{1} γi to both sides of (11), and use the fact that
P
i∈X γi +W = 1), which is in
turn equivalent to
1
2
>
X
i∈X\{1}
γi +
γM
2
. (12)
To prove that (12), note that if 12 <
P
i∈X\{1} γi +
γM
2 , then
P
i∈N\X γi +
γM
2 <
1
2 and
X
i∈X
γi =
⎛
⎝ X
i∈X\{1}
γi +
γM
2
⎞
⎠+ γM
2
>
⎛
⎝ X
i∈N\X
γi +
γM
2
⎞
⎠+ γM
2
=
X
i∈N\X
γi + γM .
Since
P
i∈N\X γi + γM >
1
2 , the above inequality yields that (N \ X, γM) rather than X is
the minimal winning coalition, which is a contradiction. Therefore, γ0i > γi for any i ∈ X. Using
assumptions 1—3 about the payoﬀ functions completes the proof of Theorem 5.
We also conjecture (but have not yet proved) that Theorem 5 holds for any α > 1/2.
8 Conclusion
The central question of political economy is how collective choices are made among a group of
individuals with conflicting preferences (and potentially diﬀerent “powers”). We study this question
in the context of a game of endogenous coalition formation. We assume that each individual is
endowed with a level of political power, which may be derived from his or her specific skills or
access to resources (guns, money etc.). The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals
in the society and decides the distribution of resources. The main innovation of our approach is
that we also require ruling coalitions to be self-enforcing, in the sense that none of the subcoalitions
of this ruling coalition should be able to secede and become the new ruling coalition.
We first model these issues using an axiomatic approach based on four axioms. The two im-
portant axioms are that the ruling coalition should be powerful enough (the power constraint)
and that the ruling coalition should be self-enforcing (the enforcement constraint). We prove that
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there exists a unique mapping, which is generically single-valued, that satisfies these axioms. This
provides an axiomatic way of characterizing the ruling coalitions for any game.
We support this notion by showing that the result of our axiomatic analysis also follows from
the “reasonable equilibria” of a dynamic game of coalition formation and also as the unique core
allocation of a related non-transferable cooperative game. In particular, we construct a simple
dynamic game that captures the same notions that a ruling coalition should have a certain amount
of power and should be self-enforcing (stable). As with other dynamic voting games, this game
possesses many subgame perfect equilibria. We propose the notion of sequentially weakly dominant
equilibrium as an equilibrium concept for this and related games (which referred to as agenda-
setting games). We prove that agenda-setting games always have sequentially weakly dominant
equilibria and Markov trembling and perfect equilibria. Moreover, in our dynamic game, both
concepts generically yield a unique equilibrium allocation.
After establishing these results on the existence of equilibria and ruling coalitions in related
axiomatic, noncooperative and cooperative games, we present a series of results on the structure of
ruling coalitions. In particular, we establish the following results:
• Despite the simplicity of the environment, the ruling coalition can be of any size relative to the
society, and may include or exclude more powerful individuals in the society. Consequently,
the equilibrium payoﬀ of an individual is not monotone in his power.
• Self-enforcing coalitions are generally “fragile,” especially under majority rule. For example,
under majority rule, adding or subtracting one player from a self-enforcing coalition makes
it non-self-enforcing. Despite this type of fragility of self-enforcing coalitions, we also show
that the ruling coalition is “continuous,” in the sense that two games where the powers of the
players are suﬃciently close will have the same ruling coalition.
• Somewhat paradoxically, an increase in α–that is an increase in the degree of supermajority
necessary to make decisions–does not necessarily lead to larger ruling coalitions. Also, the
most powerful individual will be often excluded from the ruling coalition, unless he is powerful
enough to win by himself or weak enough so as to be part of smaller self-enforcing coalitions.
• Coalitions of certain sizes are more likely to emerge as the ruling coalition. For example, with
majority rule, i.e., α = 1/2, the ruling coalition cannot (generically) consist of two individuals.
Moreover, again when α = 1/2, coalitions where members have roughly the same power exist
only when the coalition’s size is 2k − 1 where k is an integer.
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There are a number of natural areas for future study. A similar approach blending axiomatic
foundations and dynamic games can be adopted to analyze the structure of ruling coalitions in
a more general class of political games, where there are multiple resources to be distributed (or
multiple policies over which individuals disagree). Our results on general agenda-setting games
suggest that the approach here might be extended to this more general setting. Another interesting
area for future research would be to investigate what types of coalitions will form when there is some
randomness in the environment, for example, if the powers or preferences of diﬀerent individuals
may change by a small amount after the coalition is formed. Such an approach would allow us to
determine the extent to which a coalition is “robust” and also to quantify what “price” the coalition
is willing to pay for robustness by including individuals that may not be necessary for obtaining a
majority.
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Appendix A: Markov Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibria
We now introduce the notion of Markov Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibria (MTHPE) and establish both a
number of general results about MTHPE and also prove that the results in Section 4 apply with MTHPE
in the same way as they do with SWDE. With the terminology in subsection 4.2, we have:
Definition 10 A continuation strategy σi,t is Markovian if
σi,t
¡
ht−1
¢
= σi,t
³
h˜t−1
´
for all ht−1, h˜t−1 ∈ Ht−1 such that for any ai,t, a˜i,t ∈ Ai,t and any a−i,t ∈ A−i,t we have
ui
¡
ai,t, a−i,t | ht−1¢ ≥ ui ¡a˜i,t, a−i,t | ht−1¢
implies that
ui
³
ai,t, a−i,t | h˜t−1
´
≥ ui
³
a˜i,t, a−i,t | h˜t−1
´
.
Definition 11 We say that a strategy profile
¡
σˆ1, ..., σˆn
¢
of an extensive-form game in agent-strategic form is
Markov Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE) if there exists a sequence of totally mixed Markovian
strategy profiles
©¡
σˆ1 (m) , . . . , σˆn (m)
¢ª
m∈N (meaning that continuation strategy σ
i,0 (m) is Markovian for
all i = 1, . . . , n and all m ∈ N) such that
¡
σˆ1 (m) , . . . , σˆn (m)
¢
→
¡
σˆ1, . . . , σˆn
¢
as m→∞ and
ui
¡
σˆi, σˆ−i (m)
¢
≥ ui
¡
σi, σˆ−i (m)
¢
for all σi ∈ Σi, for all m ∈M and for all i = 1, . . . , n.
We say that a strategy profile
¡
σˆ1, ..., σˆn
¢
of an extensive-form game in strategic form is Markov Trembling-
Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE) if it is MTHPE is corresponding agent-strategic form game.
Note that MTHPE is defined directly in the agent-strategic form in order to avoid standard problems
that arise when trembling hand perfection is defined on the strategic form (e.g., Selten, 1975, Osborne and
Rubinstein, 1994). After characterizing the SWDEs of our game, we will also characterize the MTHPEs for
game Γˆ and show their equivalence.
We next show that for our extensive form game the MTHPE refinement leads to the same equilibrium
URC and payoﬀs as the SWDE. Our main results are contained Theorem 7, which is the equivalent of
Theorem 2 for MTHPE under Assumption 1. In addition, we will establish that an MTHPE exists in a
more general class of political games, which we refer to as agenda-setting games.16 We will also show that
in this class of games, every MTHPE is an SWDE, so an SWDE exists. Nevertheless, these two equilibrium
concepts do not always coincide. First, a MTHPE always exists, while SWDE may not. Second, there may
exist SWDEs that are not MTHPE (see Theorem 6 and Appendix B).
Let us first define general agenda-setting games, which include most voting games as a special case, and
establish the existence of MTHPE and SWDE for these games.
Definition 12 A finite perfect-information game Γ in extensive form with a set of players N ∪ {Nature} is
called an agenda-setting game if and only if at each stage ξ either
1. only one player (possibly Nature) moves, or
2. there is voting among the players in X ⊂ N . Voting means that
(a) each player i ∈ X has two actions, say ayi (ξ) and ani (ξ);
(b) those in N \X have no action or only one action at this stage;
16Another trembling hand refinement used in the literature, truly perfect equilibrium, is stronger than our notion of
MTHPE. A truly perfect equilibrium requires strategies from σ to be best responses to all fully mixed profiles in some
neighborhood of σ rather than to one sequence of profiles in the standard case and to one sequence of Markovian
profiles in the case of MTHPE. However, this equilibrium concept fails to exist in many games, including our dynamic
game of coalition formation (except in some special cases).
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(c) there are only two equivalence classes of subgames following node ξ (where equivalence classes
of subgames include subgames that are continuation payoﬀ identical), say y (ξ) and n (ξ);
(d) for each player i ∈ X and for any other players’ actions held fixed, the action ayi (ξ) does not
decrease the probability of moving into the equivalence classes of subgames y (ξ).
This definition states that any game in which one of the agents makes a proposal and others vote in
favor or against this proposal is an agenda-setting game. Moreover, any perfect-information game where
players move sequentially is an agenda-setting game, as is any game with consecutive votings over pairs of
alternatives. Clearly, our dynamic game here is an agenda-setting game. We prove the following general
result about equilibria in agenda-setting games.
Theorem 6 1. Any finite extensive-form game has a MTHPE (possibly in mixed strategies).
2. Any agenda-setting game has a MTHPE and a SWDE in pure strategies.
3. In an agenda-setting game, any MTHPE is a SWDE.
4. There exist games where a MTHPE is not a SWDE.
5. There exist agenda-setting games where a SWDE is not a MTHPE.
Proof. (Part 1) Consider a perturbed game where each player i ∈ N is confined to play each action
at each stage with probability ηik,t ≥ η > 0, where η is a small number, to each of its finite number of
actions in each stage. By the standard fixed point theorem argument, this perturbed game has a Nash
equilibrium; moreover, the fixed point theorem applies if we restrict our attention to Markovian strategies
only. Therefore, the perturbed game has a Markov Perfect Equilibria
¡
a1
¡
η
¢
, . . . , an
¡
η
¢¢
. Because the
action space has finite dimensions and is thus compact, we can choose a sequence η1, η2, . . . which converges
to 0 such that
¡
a1
¡
ηk
¢
, . . . , an
¡
ηk
¢¢
has a limit. This limit would be a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
in Markovian strategies, i.e. an MTHPE.
(Part 2) Let us prove that an agenda-setting game has a MTHPE in pure strategies, then the result for
SWDE will immediately follow from Part 3. We do this by induction on the number of stages. The base is
trivial; indeed, consider a one-shot agenda-setting game. If this stage is one-player move, then, evidently, the
action which maximizes his utility constitutes a pure strategy MTHPE, since it is Markovian and trembling-
hand perfect. If the single stage is voting, then each player i weakly prefers one of the outcomes to another.
It is trivial to check that voting for a weakly preferred outcome is an MTHPE.
Now proceed with the induction step. Suppose that we have proved the existence of pure strategy
MTHPE in all agenda-setting games with number of stages less than T ; take an agenda-setting game with
T stages. Consider its first stage. Suppose that there is one player i making a choice between k actions
a1, . . . , ak. In each of k corresponding subgames there exists (by induction) a pure strategy MTHPE; we
can choose the same MTHPE for isomorphic subgames. Therefore, there exist sequences of strategy profiles
σ1j , σ
2
j , . . . for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k} which converge to a pure strategy MTHPE for each such j and which
are Nash equilibria in constrained game; moreover, we can require that if two subgames (for j = j1, j2 are
isomorphic, then σnj1 = σ
n
j2 for any n. Now, consider player i at first stage. For any n, there is jn such that
ajn is weakly better than other actions. Since there are a finite number of actions, there is action j such that
aj is weakly better than other actions for infinitely many values of n. It is now straightforward to prove that
aj , along with the chosen MTHPE, forms a pure strategy MTHPE of the whole game. Now suppose that
the initial stage is a voting. Then there are two subgames; take a pure strategy MTHPE in each (if they
are isomorphic, take the same MTHPE), and we can similarly construct two sequences of strategy profiles
σ1y, σ2y, . . . and σ1n, σ2n, . . . Each player i has two actions, y and n, in stage 1. Consider one of players (i)
and take any m. If in the subgames strategies σmy and σ
m
n are played, respectively, then player i weakly
prefers to choose one of the actions, y or n, to another one. There is an action a (i) which is weakly preferred
for infinite number of m’s. Now consider two subsequences of sequences σ1y, σ2y, . . . and σ1n, σ2n, . . . which
are formed by values of m for which a (i) is weakly better for player i. Take another player, j, and repeat
the procedure; then we will get action a (j) and two subsequences of the previous subsequences. Since the
number of players is finite, we can proceed in this way, and for any player i find action a (i). It is now evident
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that the MTHPEs chosen for the stages starting from the second one and actions a (i) for each player i at
the first stage, form a pure strategy MTHPE.
(Part 3) Next take any strategy profile σ that forms a MTHPE. This is proved by backward induction
on the number of stages in the game. Suppose that the Lemma has been proved for games with q0 < q stages.
Consider an agenda-setting game with q stages and take any MTHPE in it. By induction, this MTHPE,
when truncated to any of the game’s proper subgames, forms a SWDE. Consider its first stage.
Suppose that only one player i moves at this stage and denote his expected utility (in this MTHPE)
from making action a at first stage by uai . If action a
∗ is an action played with a non-zero probability in
equilibrium then ua
∗
i ≥ uai for any other feasible action a (otherwise there would exist a payoﬀ-improving
deviation). Hence, all actions played in a MTHPE with a non-zero probability yield the same expected
utility for player i, and this utility is maximum possible over the set of feasible actions. Hence, this MTHPE
is a SWDE.
Now consider the other situation where the first stage is a voting stage. Consider a profile σ0 consisting of
fully mixed strategies and suppose that it is η-close to σ for a small η. Depending on how other players vote,
three mutually exclusive situations are possible: proposal is accepted regardless of how player i votes, it is
rejected regardless of how he votes, and player i is pivotal; let μ+, μ−, and μp be the respective probabilities
of these events. By definition, μ+ + μ− + μp = 1, and by assumption μp > 0. Voting for the proposal
yields (μ+ + μp)u+0i + μ
−u−0i in expectation, voting against it yields μ
+u+0i + (μ
− + μp)u−0i where u
+0
i and
u−0i are i’s utilities from acceptance and rejection of the proposal if profile σ
0 is played. Thus, if u+0i > u
−0
i
then player i’s sole best response is voting for the proposal, and if u+0i < u
−0
i it is voting against it. If η is
suﬃciently small then u+i > u
−
i implies u
+0
i > u
−0
i , and thus by definition of MTHPE player i must support
the proposal in equilibrium with probability one. Similar reasoning applies to the case u+i < u
−
i .
Now take any player i who participates in voting. If u+i > u
−
i , then he votes for the proposal in this
MTHPE. This is a weakly dominant strategy for him (given continuation strategies of himself and other
players). Similarly, if u+i < u
−
i then the strategy he plays in this MTHPE is weakly dominant. If, u
+
i = u
−
i
or the player is never pivotal, any strategy is weakly dominant. Therefore, for any player, the strategy he
plays in this MTHPE is weakly dominant, and thus this MTHPE is a SWDE. This completes the induction
step.
(Part 4) Consider a one-stage game with two players making simultaneous moves with payoﬀ matrix
l r
L (1, 1) (0, 0)
R (0, 0) (1, 1)
.
This game does not have SWDE, because it is one-stage and in that only stage neither of the players has a
weakly dominant strategy. It is straightforward to check, however, that both (L, l) and (R, r) are MTHPEs
of this game.
(Part 5) This follows from Example 7 in Appendix B.
In addition to the existence results, which are of interest in and of themselves, Theorem 6 establishes
that while MTHPE and SWDE are not subsets of one another in general, but for agenda-setting games an
MTHPE is always a SWDE (so within this class of games SWDE is a stronger concept). This implies, in
particular, existence of a SWDE in an agenda-setting game, which then follows from existence of an MTHPE.
Theorem 7 Any extensive-form game Γˆ (N, γ|N , α) has at least one pure strategy MTHPE. Moreover, sup-
pose that Assumption 1 holds. Then any MTHPE (in pure or mixed strategies) is a SWDE, and, in particular,
the only ultimate ruling coalition (URC) is given by φ (N) as defined in Theorem 1. The URC is reached
after one stage of elimination, and the payoﬀ of each i ∈ N is given by (7).
Proof. For any N , game Γˆ (N, γ|N , α) is an agenda-setting game as it satisfies Definition 12. By Theorem
6 a pure strategy MTHPE always exists and, moreover, any MTHPE is a SWDE. The rest of the Theorem
7 follows immediately from the characterization of SWDEs in Theorem 2.
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9 Appendix B: Examples
SPNE and MPE in the Dynamic Game
Example 4 Let α = 1/2, |N | = 4, N = {A,B,C,D}, players’ powers be given by γA = 4, γB = 5, γC = 6,
γD = 8, and players’ utilities from coalitions be given by (2). Take some MTHPE σ∗ of the dynamic game
Γˆ (N, γ|N , α) and consider the following modification σX , where X is one of the six three-player coalitions
of players from N . Before any elimination, if X is proposed, player i votes y˜ if i ∈ X and votes n˜ if i /∈ X;
if any proposal other than X is made, all players vote n˜. If player i ∈ X is the agenda-setter, he proposes
coalition X, while if i /∈ X is the agenda-setter, the proposal is N . After the first elimination has taken
place, the corresponding part of σ∗ is played.
Using the fact that σ∗ is MTHPE, it is easy to see that strategies from σX are Markovian, it is also
straightforward to check that σX forms a SPNE. Before any elimination occurred, it is not profitable to
deviate at the stage of voting. Indeed, if the proposal is X, a deviation by player i /∈ X does not change the
outcome of voting, while if player i ∈ X makes a one-shot deviation, the URC will be either X or N ; the
latter outcome being worse for such i than X, because wi (X) > wi (N). If the proposal under consideration
is some other proposal Y 6= X, then none of the players is pivotal, and a deviation will not change the
outcome of the voting or the subsequent equilibrium strategies (because strategies are Markovian). It is also
straightforward to check that any deviation is not profitable at the stage where proposals are made (mainly
because no proposal other than X may be accepted in the subsequent voting). After the first elimination,
strategies from σ∗ are played. Given all this, σX is both a SPNE and a MPE. Evidently, the URC in σX is
X with probability 1.
So, for any of the six three-player coalitions, we have constructed a strategy profile which is a SPNE
and, moreover, a MPE. Therefore, none of these refinements help us get a unique prediction of the outcome
of the dynamic game (even though Assumption 1) is satisfied.
Dynamic Game Without ε
Example 5 Let α = 1/2, |N | = 4, N = {A,B,C,D}, players’ powers be given by γA = 2, γB = 4, γC = 7,
γD = 10, and players’ utilities from coalitions be given by (2). Theorem 2 establishes that if ε > 0, the only
possible URC that may emerge in SWDE is {B,C,D} (it is straightforward to check that any other winning
coalition is not self-enforcing). Denote the pure strategy SWDE profile constructed in the proof of Theorem
2 by σ∗; note that it does not depend on ε. Because all utilities are continuous in ε, we immediately get
that even if ε = 0, σ∗ forms a SWDE.
Consider strategy profile σ0 which coincides with σ∗ for all players and histories except the following.
If the first proposer i0,1 ∈ {A,D}, then he proposes X0,1 = {A,D}. If the first proposal is X0,1 = {A,D},
then players A and D cast vote y˜, while players B and C cast vote n˜. Let us show that this strategy profile
forms a SWDE.
Suppose the first proposal is X0,1 = {A,D}. If it is accepted, then B and C are eliminated, and
subsequently D eliminates A. Therefore, u−A = u
−
B = u
−
C = 0, u
−
D = 1 (because ε = 0), while if it is rejected,
then, as follows from the construction of σ∗, {B,C,D} will be the URC, resulting in u−A = 0, u−B = 4/21,
u−C = 1/3, u
−
D = 10/21. It is evident that voting y˜ is weakly dominant for A and D, and voting n˜ is weakly
dominant for B and C. Now suppose that A or D is the first to make proposal. If he makes proposal {A,D}
then, as we have just proved, it will be the URC. If he makes any other proposal, then, as again follows from
construction of σ∗, {B,C,D} will be the URC. Therefore, proposing {A,D} is weakly dominant for A and
strictly dominant for D. Finally, in any other node players’ behavior is optimal because σ∗ coincides with
σ0 in the subsequent subgame. Therefore, σ0 is indeed a SWDE.
In SWDE σ0, the URC is {B,C,D} if the first proposer (chosen by Nature) is B or C, and {D} if the
first proposer is A or D (indeed, once proposal {A,D} is accepted, player A will be eliminated). Hence,
this equilibrium, σ0, features at least two unappealing properties. First, the outcome may depend on the
order of proposals. Second, players that will be eliminated anyway (A in this example) may have have a
non-trivial eﬀect on the outcome, depending on how they vote when they are indiﬀerent. Introducing small
organizational costs ε > 0 allows us to get rid of these eﬀects and get equilibria where the ultimate ruling
coalition that emerges in equilibrium is uniquely determined.
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(5,5,5) (0,0,0) (5,5,5) (0,0,0) (5,5,5) (0,0,0) (7,7,7)
L R
l rr l
a1 b1 a2 b2 a3 b3
Figure 3: A Game With Herding in Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium.
It may seem at first glance that σ0 is not a MTHPE, because player A will not vote for proposal {A,D}
but it actually is one. Without going into much detail, A will vote for {A,D} if it is much more likely that
D will make a mistake and not propose {D} after elimination of B and C than that B, C, and D will make
a mistake and fail to eliminate A if proposal {A,D} is not accepted.
THPE vs. MTHPE
Example 6 Consider a game of three players with extensive form and payoﬀs as shown on Figure 3. The
first two players vote, and if both vote for the ‘right’, all three players receive first-best; if one of them votes
for the ‘left’ then the third player chooses between ‘moderate’ and ‘bad’. All players receive the same in all
terminal nodes, so there is no strategic conflict between them.
Equilibrium (R, r, (a1, a2, a3)) is trembling-hand perfect, but so is (L, l, (a1, a2, a3)) where eﬃciency is
not achieved because of ‘herding’ in voting (note that neither L not l are dominated strategies: for instance,
L is best response to second player playing l and third player playing (a1, b2, b3)). Indeed, take some η and
consider
σn =
¡¡
1− η3
¢
L+ η3R,
¡
1− η3
¢
l + η3r,
¡¡
1− η2
¢
a1 + η2b1, (1− η) a2 + ηb2, (1− η) a3 + ηb3
¢¢
.
Evidently, player 3 (and all his agents in agent-strategic form) are better oﬀ choosing a1 over b1, a2 over
b2, and a3 over b3. Now consider payoﬀs of player 1 choosing L or R. If he chooses L, he gets uL =
5
¡¡
1− η3
¢ ¡
1− η2
¢
+ η3 (1− η)
¢
= 5−5η2−5η4+5η5. If he chooses R, he gets uR = 5
¡¡
1− η3
¢
(1− η)
¢
+
7η3 = 5−5η+2η3+5η4. Hence, For small η, player 1 should put all weight to L, and a similar argument would
show that player 2 should put all weight to l. This proves that (L, l, (a1, a2, a3)) is also a trembling-hand
perfect equilibrium.
The eﬀect that Example 6 emphasizes would not be the case if fully mixed profiles σn were required
to be Markovian, which is what our definition of MTHPE imposes. Indeed, it is a natural restriction to
require that in the three subgames where player 3 moves and payoﬀs are identical, his mixed action profile
σn should lead to identical place. In that case, the increase of utility of player 1 due to the possibility of
player 2 playing r instead of l would be not be oﬀset by worse development in the subgame if he still plays l.
SWDE vs. MTHPE
Example 7 Consider a game of two players with extensive form depicted on Figure 4. This is an agenda-
setting game, because at each stage only one player has a (non-trivial) move. It game has exactly one
MTHPE (R, r). However, there are two SWDEs: (R, r) and (L, r). The latter is not MTHPE, because if
there is a non-zero chance that player 2 will play l, player 1 is better oﬀ putting all weight to R.
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Figure 4: A Game With SWDE which is not MTHPE
Appendix C: Proofs of Theorems 2 and 3
Proof of Theorem 2.
(Part 1 of Theorem) The first part of the Theorem (existence of pure strategy SWDE with in the
required properties) is proved by induction on the size of coalition |N |.
The base of the induction is straightforward. If |N | = 1, then from Theorem 1, φ (N) = {N}. It is also
straightforward that in the unique SWDE, the single player i will propose coalition X0,1 = N and then vote
in favor of it, i.e., v0,1 (i) = y˜. Therefore, when |N | = 1, there exists a pure strategy SWDE, with the URC
reached after at most one stage elimination and coincides with an element of φ (N).
Suppose next that we have proved this result for all coalition sizes less than n, and we will prove it for
any coalition N with |N | = n.
First, we introduce the following notation. Let v be a one-to-one map between P (N) and the set©
1, . . . , 2|N | − 1
ª
; let νX denote the number corresponding toX ⊂ N , and assume that the setM corresponds
to 1 (i.e., νM = 1). Define a single-valued mapping φ∗ : P (N)→ P (N) by
φ∗ (X) = argmin
A∈φ(X)
νA. (13)
Then, νM = 1 implies that φ∗ (N) =M , since M ∈ φ (X). Also, Corollary 1 implies that φ∗ (X) = X if and
only if X is self-enforcing, i.e., if and only if X ∈ φ (X).
Consider j = 0, i.e., the stage of the game before any elimination has taken place. Suppose that the
first q (0 ≤ q ≤ |N |− 1) proposals made by players i0,1, . . . , i0,q were rejected, and Nature has picked player
i0,q+1 as the next agenda-setter. Denote Aq = N \ {i0,1, . . . , i0,q} for 1 ≤ q ≤ |N | and A−1 = N . For any
player i, let us define the set of minimal self-enforcing coalitions including this player:
χi = argmin
A∈{X:X⊂N,γX>αγN ,φ∗(X)=X,X3i}∪{N}
γA, (14)
and a selection from the set,
χ∗i = argmin
A∈χi
νA. (15)
Similarly, for any X ⊂ N , let as define the corresponding sets
χX =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
argmin
{A:|∃i∈X:χ∗i=A}
γA if X 6= ∅;
{N} otherwise,
(16)
and
χ∗X = argmin
A∈χX
νA. (17)
Notice that for any i ∈ N , χ∗i either equals N or is a winning coalition that satisfies φ∗ (χ∗i ) = χ∗i (or both).
The same is true for χ∗X for any X ⊂ N . Moreover, if Y ⊂ X ⊂ N , then γχ∗X ≤ γχ∗Y .
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Next, for a non-empty X ⊂ N, let
ψ (X) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
φ∗ (X) if X 6= N ;
N otherwise.
(18)
With ψ (X) defined this way, for any X ⊂ N , ψ (χ∗X) = χ∗X .
We now construct a pure strategy SWDE profile.
Consider the following profile: if j = 0, then player i0,q (i.e., the qth proposer, for 1 ≤ q ≤ |N |), oﬀers
X0,q = χ∗i0,q . For any proposal X made by the qth proposer, player i ∈ X casts the following vote:
v0,q (i,X) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
n˜
if i /∈ ψ (X) or
i ∈ χ∗Aq , γψ(X) ≥ γχ∗Aq , and X 6= χ
∗
Aq−1
;
y˜ otherwise.
(19)
This voting rule implies that a player votes against a proposal that leaves him out of the URC along the
continuation equilibrium path and also against a proposal that is not better than a proposal that will be
made if the current one is rejected (unless the current proposal is χ∗Aq−1).
After the first elimination has taken place, the subgame coincides with Γˆ (N1, γ|N1 , α), where |N1| <
|N |. By the induction hypothesis, it has a pure strategy SWDE that satisfies the necessary conditions, in
particular, it has a pure strategy SWDE that leads to φ∗ (N1) (after at most one round of elimination).
Now denote the pure strategy profile for the entire game described above by σ∗N,φ∗ . We will show that
it forms a SWDE. The first step is the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the current history h is such that there has been no eliminations (i.e., j = 0), the
first q proposals (0 ≤ q ≤ |N |) were made by players i0,1, . . . , i0,q and rejected, and h terminates in the node
after the qth rejection (if q = 0, h = {∅}). Then:
1. Profile σ∗N,φ∗ is an h-SWDE.
2. The play of σ∗N,φ∗ after history h will result in coalition χ
∗
Aq−1 (where recall that Aq = N \
{i0,1, . . . , i0,q}) as the URC with probability 1.
3. Continuation utility of player i ∈ N is given by
ui
¡
σ∗N,φ∗ | h
¢
= wi
³
χ∗Aq−1
´
− εIχ∗Aq−1 (i) I
?
χ∗Aq−1 6=N
?. (20)
Proof. (Part 1 of Lemma) This part of the lemma is also proved by induction. If q = |N |, then the game
has reached a terminal node, and the URC is N . Player i receives (20), because χ∅ = N . Moreover, since
there are no more actions left, profile σ∗N,φ∗ is h-SWDE.
The induction step goes as follows. Suppose that we have proved the Lemma for the number of rejections
greater than or equal to q. Given this, we will establish it for q − 1 (1 ≤ q ≤ |N |).
Consider qth voting over proposal X made by player i0,q and suppose that it is accepted. If X 6= N and
is accepted, player i ∈ X will receive payoﬀ
u+i = wi (ψ (X))− εI{X 6=N}
¡
1 + I{φ∗(X)6=X}Iφ∗(X) (i)
¢
. (21)
This follows from the induction hypothesis of Theorem 2, which implies that when X 6= N , ψ (X) = φ∗ (X),
and the continuation payoﬀ of player i in the game Γˆ (X, γ|X , α) is given by wi (X)− εIφ∗(X) (i) I{φ∗(X)6=X},
and we also subtract ε when coalition X is not the ultimate one, because i ∈ X. If X = N , the game ends
immediately and (21) again applies.
If proposal X is rejected, player i receives, by induction of this Lemma, payoﬀ given by (20), so
u−i = wi
³
χ∗Aq
´
− εIχ∗Aq (i) I
?
χ∗Aq 6=N
?. (22)
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Notice that both (21) and (22) hold regardless of the distribution of votes.
If i /∈ ψ (X), then
u+i ≤ wi (ψ (X)) = w−i .
If, in addition, i /∈ χ∗Aq , then
u−i = wi
³
χ∗Aq
´
= w−i ,
and if i ∈ χ∗Aq , then
u−i ≥ wi
³
χ∗Aq
´
− ε > w−i
(this follows because, by construction, ε is small and satisfies (5)). These expressions imply that in both
cases u+i ≤ u−i , and voting n˜ is weakly dominant for player i.
Next, consider the case i ∈ ψ (X). If all three conditions i ∈ χ∗Aq , γψ(X) ≥ γχ∗Aq , and X 6= χ
∗
Aq−1 are
satisfied, then
u−i = wi
³
χ∗Aq
´
− εIχ∗Aq (i) I
?
χ∗Aq 6=N
?
≥ wi (ψ (X))− εI{X 6=N}
≥ u+i ,
because X 6= N implies ψ (X) 6= N , which together with γψ(X) ≥ γχ∗Aq implies χ
∗
Aq 6= N (and Iχ∗Aq (i) = 1).
This yields that for player i it is weakly dominant to vote n˜.
Now assume that at least one of these three conditions (i.e., i ∈ χ∗Aq , γψ(X) ≥ γχ∗Aq , and X 6= χ
∗
Aq−1)
does not hold. If i /∈ χ∗Aq , then wi (ψ (X)) > wi
³
χ∗Aq
´
, and (again, since ε satisfies (5))
u+i ≥ wi (ψ (X))− ε
> w−i
= u−i .
If i ∈ χ∗Aq , but γψ(X) < γχ∗Aq , then again wi (ψ (X)) > wi
³
χ∗Aq
´
and u+i > u
−
i . Finally, if i ∈ χ∗Aq ,
γψ(X) ≥ γχ∗Aq , but X = χ
∗
Aq−1 , we have
ψ (X) = ψ
³
χ∗Aq−1
´
= χ∗Aq−1 .
Furthermore, since Aq ⊂ Aq−1,
γψ(X) = γχ∗Aq−1
≤ γχ∗Aq ,
and therefore γψ(X) = γχ∗Aq , so wi (ψ (X)) = wi
³
χ∗Aq
´
. If X = N , then ψ (X) = N and γχ∗Aq = N , so
u+i = u
−
i . If X 6= N and X = χ∗Aq−1 , then φ∗ (X) = X, and
u+i = wi (ψ (X))− ε = wi
³
χ∗Aq
´
− ε = u−i .
In all these cases we have u+i ≥ u−i , and therefore voting y˜ is weakly dominant.
Now denote the precursor history to history h by h0. The above argument has established that profile
σ∗N,φ∗ is a h
0-SWDE, because both in the case the proposal is accepted and in the case it is rejected, this
profile is an SWDE for the corresponding history (by induction of Theorem 2 or by induction of this Lemma).
Next consider history h00, after which player i0,q makes a proposal. Denote player i’s utility if i0,q makes
proposal X at this stage by ui (X). Similarly, denote his utility if proposal X is made and is accepted by
u+i (X). We next prove that ui0,q
³
χ∗i0,q
´
≥ ui0,q (X) for any X ∈ P (N). First, notice that regardless of i0,q’s
proposal, the continuation equilibrium play will lead to some URC, Y , satisfying ψ (Y ) = Y (if proposal Y
is rejected, then the URC will be χ∗Aq , as we have just proved, and if it is accepted it will be either N if
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Y = N or φ∗ (N) if Y 6= N , which follows from the induction hypothesis in Theorem 2). By definition of
χ∗i0,q , wi0,q
³
χ∗i0,q
´
≥ wi0,q (Y ) for any such Y .
Consider the following cases.
(i) χ∗i0,q is accepted if proposed. Then χ
∗
i0,q becomes the URC after at most one round of elimination.
This implies that player i0,q receives
ui
³
χ∗i0,q
´
= u+i
³
χ∗i0,q
´
= wi
³
χ∗i0,q
´
− εI?
χ∗i0,q 6=N
?,
since i0,q ∈ χ∗i0,q and the analysis above has established that he cannot receive higher utility if he proposes
some X 6= χ∗i0,q .
(ii) χ∗i0,q is rejected if proposed. Then consider i0,q proposing some X ∈ P (N). If X is also rejected
when proposed, then ui0,q
³
χ∗i0,q
´
= u−i0,q = ui0,q (X). If X is accepted, then the URC is ψ (X). However,
for X to be accepted given profile σ∗N,φ∗ , at least one member of coalition χ
∗
Aq must vote y˜ (because χ
∗
Aq is
a winning coalition). Then (19) suggests, either γψ(X) < γχ∗Aq or X = χ
∗
Aq−1 (or both). In the first case, we
obtain
γψ(X) < γχ∗Aq ≤ γχ∗i0,q .
This implies that i0,q /∈ ψ (X) (otherwise χ∗i0,q /∈ χi0,q because ψ (X) has lower total power, see (14)). But
then
ui0,q (X) = u
+
i0,q (X)
≤ wi0,q (ψ (X)) .
However, we also have
ui0,q
³
χ∗i0,q
´
= u−i0,q
= wi0,q
³
χ∗Aq
´
− εIχ∗Aq (i0,q) I
?
χ∗Aq 6=N
?.
Consequently,
ui0,q (X) ≤ ui0,q
³
χ∗i0,q
´
. (23)
In the second case, if X = χ∗Aq−1 , we have X = χ
∗
i for some i ∈ Aq−1. However, i 6= i0,q (otherwise X could
not be accepted when χ∗i0,q is rejected), and thus i ∈ Aq. Then, (16) and (17) imply χ
∗
Aq−1 = χ
∗
Aq (because
ν reaches its minimum on the same coalition both for χAq−1 and χAq), so X = χ
∗
Aq . Then,
ui0,q (X) = u
+
i0,q (X)
= wi0,q (X)− εIX (i0,q) I{X 6=N}
= wi0,q
³
χ∗Aq
´
− εIχ∗Aq (i0,q) I
?
χ∗Aq 6=N
?
= u−i
= ui0,q
³
χ∗i0,q
´
,
as implied by (22).
Consequently, in both cases (i) and (ii), (23) holds, and therefore proposing χ∗i0,q is weakly dominant for
player i0,q. This establishes that the profile σ∗N,φ∗ is h
00-SWDE.
To prove that σ∗N,φ∗ is h-SWDE we need to go one more step back, before Nature chooses the qth
proposer. This is straightforward, since for Nature all moves are weakly dominant. This completes the
induction step and the proof of Part 1.
(Part 2 of Lemma) We need to prove that after history h, χ∗Aq−1 will be chosen along the equilibrium
path, and this is regardless of the qth proposer i0,q that Nature chooses (provided that i0,q ∈ Aq−1, as
required). In equilibrium, χ∗i0,q is proposed by player i0,q (irrespective of the identity of this player is).
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Consider two cases.
(i) χ∗i0,q is accepted (which this happens with probability 1, because strategies are pure), then there is
at least one player i ∈ χ∗Aq who has voted y˜ (χ
∗
Aq is a winning coalition, and if all its members vote n˜, the
proposal cannot be accepted). For i ∈ χ∗Aq to vote y˜, either γχ∗i0,q < γχ∗Aq or χ
∗
i0,q = χ
∗
Aq−1 (or both) must
hold (see (19)), and note that ψ
³
χ∗i0,q
´
= χ∗i0,q . In the first case, χAq−1 is clearly a singleton consisting of χ
∗
i0,q
only (because the other sets in argmin in (16) have total power greater than χ∗i0,q), and thus χ
∗
Aq−1 = χ
∗
i0,q .
In the latter case, this equality holds automatically. In both cases the URC is χ∗i0,q = χ
∗
Aq−1 , and there is
are no more than one round of elimination (because either χ∗i0,q = N or φ
∗
³
χ∗i0,q
´
= χ∗i0,q).
(ii) χ∗i0,q is rejected. In this case, there is at least one player i ∈ χ
∗
Aq who has voted n˜ (otherwise it
would be accepted because χ∗Aq is winning within N), which implies γχ∗i0,q
≥ γχ∗Aq and χ
∗
i0,q 6= χ∗Aq−1 (recall
(19)). The first inequality implies that γχ∗Aq−1
≥ γχ∗Aq (indeed, χ
∗
Aq−1 either belongs to χ
∗
Aq or equals χ
∗
i0,q ),
and Aq ⊂ Aq−1 implies γχ∗Aq−1 ≤ γχ∗Aq , so γχ∗Aq−1 = γχ∗Aq . Consequently, χAq ⊂ χAq−1 . The inequality
χ∗i0,q 6= χ∗Aq−1 implies that
χ∗i0,q 6= argmin
A∈χAq−1
νA,
therefore,
χ∗Aq−1 = argmin
A∈χAq−1
νA ∈ χAq .
But then χAq ⊂ χAq−1 implies χ∗Aq−1 = χ
∗
Aq . Since χ
∗
i0,q is rejected, induction of Lemma 1 yields that χ
∗
Aq
is the URC with probability 1, but then the same is true for χ∗Aq−1 . Moreover, this URC is achieved after at
most one round of elimination, since the qth proposal χ∗i0,q is rejected.
The previous two steps have proved the second part of the lemma both for the case where χ∗i0,q is accepted
in equilibrium and where it is rejected and completes the proof of Part 2.
(Part 3 of Lemma) Since there is at most one round of elimination (one if χ∗i0,q 6= N and zero
otherwise), the continuation utility of player i is given by (20) by definition, and this completes the proof of
Lemma 1.
We now return to complete the induction step in the proof that σ∗N,φ∗ forms an SWDE, leading to
M ∈ φ (N) as the URC with probability 1.
We first use Lemma 1 for q = 0, i.e. at the initial node of the game Γˆ (N, γ|N , α). Lemma 1 implies
that σ∗N,φ∗ is an h-SWDE where h is empty history, so σ
∗
N,φ∗ is an SWDE. The URC is χ
∗
A−1 = χ
∗
N with
probability 1, and it is achieved after at most one round of elimination.
To prove that χ∗N = M , take any i ∈ M . The fact that νM = 1 immediately yields to results: first,
φ∗ (N) = φ∗ (M) = M ; second M ∈ χi (this is true both if M = N and if M 6= N) as M ∈ φ (N).
Consequently, there exists no coalition Y that is winning within N and satisfies Y ∈ φ (Y ) such that
γY < γM .
Moreover, by definition M = χ∗i , M ∈ χN , and, finally, M = χ∗N . So, M is the URC with probability 1
and is reached after at most one round of elimination, and players’ utilities are indeed given by (7). Hence,
this completes the induction proof about for |N | = n and thus establishes that there exists a pure strategy
SWDE leading to M ∈ φ (N) as the URC with probability 1, with payoﬀ specified in (7), completing the
proof of the first part.
(Part 2 of Theorem) First suppose that Assumption 1 holds. We will establish that in any SWDE,
the URC M = φ (N) is achieved with probability 1 after at most one stage of elimination. (Here we use
φ (X) to denote the single element of φ (X) for any X ∈ P (N) whenever it does not cause confusion.)
The proof is again by induction on |N |. The base, |N | = 1, follows immediately, since the only possible
URC in any terminal node is φ (N) = N , and therefore in any SWDE it is achieved with certainty (and
without elimination).
Now suppose that we have proved that the URC is M = φ (N) and is achieved with probability 1 after
at most one stage of elimination for all coalition sizes strictly less than n. We will then prove it for any
coalition N with |N | = n. Take any strategy profile σ∗ that forms an SWDE.
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Consider any node (on or oﬀ equilibrium path) before the first elimination took place (i.e., at j = 0).
Denote the corresponding history by h. Part 1 of the Theorem implies that any URC X that may emerge
with a non-zero probability in a SWDE (i.e., any X ∈ φσ∗ (N)) starting from this history must satisfy
ψ (X) = X (where, like in (18), ψ (X) = φ (X) if X 6= N and ψ (X) = X = N otherwise). In particular, if
no elimination ever occurs, then the URC is N which, by definition, satisfies ψ (X) = X. If an elimination
occurs (i.e., some proposal Y 6= N is accepted), then by induction, φ (Y ) becomes the URC. But we have
that
φ (φ (Y )) = φ (Y ) and φ (Y ) 6= N,
so in this case the URC φ (Y ) must satisfy
ψ (φ (Y )) = φ (Y ) .
Next, as an intermediate result, we prove that if Y ∈ φσ∗ (N), then φ (Y ) must be winning within N , i.e.,
γφ(Y ) > αγN . Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that this is not the case for coalition Y , i.e., γφ(Y ) ≤ αγN .
Take the maximum possible number of voting stages, q, where this may happen. Such a maximum exists in
view of the fact that we have a finite game. Then by hypothesis the proposal Y 6= N is being accepted with
positive probability at the qth voting stage (if all previous proposals are rejected), so γY > αγN . Also by
hypothesis γφ(Y ) ≤ αγN . Moreover, since q is the maximum voting stage where this can happen, if φ (Y ) is
rejected, then the URC will be a winning coalition with probability 1. Since γY > αγN and γφ(Y ) ≤ αγN ,
there exists some player i ∈ Y \ φ (Y ) voting y˜ in response to the proposal of Y with a positive probability
and who is pivotal for at least one configuration of votes (otherwise the proposal Y could never be accepted).
For the configuration of votes where i is pivotal, his vote of y˜ gives him utility
wi (φ (Y ))− ε = w−i − ε
(in that case, i gets −ε because he is a member of Y 6= N , and then he is eliminated). A vote of n˜ would,
on the other hand, give at least least w−i in expectation. To see this, let φσ∗ (N) = {Z}. If i ∈ Z, i receives
wi (Z)− 2ε > w−i − ε.
If i /∈ Z, that he receives w−i > w−i − ε. Therefore, n˜ can lead to strictly higher payoﬀ than y˜. This implies
that at the qth voting stage, i cannot vote y˜ with a positive probability in SWDE σ∗. Since i ∈ Y \ φ (Y )
was arbitrary, this yields a contradiction and implies that Y with γφ(Y ) ≤ αγN cannot emerge as the URC
after any history h. This yields a contradiction and establishes the intermediate result. Consequently, any
X ∈ φσ∗ (N) must satisfy ψ (X) = X. This also implies that for any coalition Y with γY < γφ(N), we have
Y /∈ φσ∗ (N) (and Assumption 1 implies that there are no coalitions with γY = γφ(N)).
The next step is to prove that ifM = φ (N) is proposed (before any elimination), thenM will necessarily
be the URC. Suppose not. Then there exists some history h and player i ∈ M who casts vote n˜ with a
positive probability (and who may be pivotal for some distribution of votes) at history h. For the equilibrium
distribution of other player’s votes, the vote of n˜ yields a payoﬀ
udi < wi (M)− εI{M 6=N}
for player i. This inequality follows because either M is not the URC, and from the previous paragraph, the
URC Z must have
γZ > γM = γφ(N),
and thus yielding lower payoﬀ to player i than wi (M)− εI{M 6=N} − εkh, or because M is the URC but will
will be reached with more than one round of elimination. Since n˜ is chosen with a positive probability as
part of SWDE σ∗, voting y˜ must yield no more than udi , and therefore, even if i voted y˜, M would not have
been reached after at most one round of elimination.
Suppose next that i switches to voting y˜, but there is some other player i0 ∈ M who also casts vote n˜
with a positive probability. With a similar reasoning, voting n˜ yields a payoﬀ of
udi0 < wi0 (M)− εI{M 6=N}
to player i0. Again since voting n˜ toM for i0 ∈M in SWDE σ∗ must be no worse than voting y˜. This implies
that even if i0 were to switch to y˜, M will still have a positive chance of not being reached, or reached after
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more than one round of elimination. Now proceeding in the same manner through all the players in M , we
can conclude that, since σ∗ is a SWDE, even if all i ∈M vote y˜,M should not be reached after no more than
one round of elimination with probability 1. This last observation yields a contradiction, however, because
of the following facts: (i) M is a winning coalition, so if all i0 ∈ M vote y˜ to the proposal of M , M will
emerge as the URC after at most one round of elimination with probability 1; (ii) when M is reached after
at most one round of elimination, each i ∈M will obtain
wi (M)− εI{M 6=N} > udi ,
implying that voting n˜ to the proposal of M could not be part of any SWDE σ∗. Consequently, we have
established that when M = φ (N) is proposed at j = 0 (before any elimination), then M will be the URC
with probability 1 under σ∗.
An identical argument applies for any stage j ≥ 0, where all i ∈M have not been eliminated. Therefore,
whenever M = φ (N) is proposed, M will be the URC with probability 1, and there cannot be any other
URC.
To complete the proof, it remains to show thatM will be oﬀered with probability 1 before any elimination
has occurred (i.e., at j = 0). Suppose that at j = 0 Nature has picked player i ∈ M as the proposer. It is
straightforward to see that in this case M will emerge as the URC after at most one round of elimination.
Suppose not. Since we know from the previous paragraph that once M is proposed, it will be accepted
with probability 1 after at most one round of elimination, giving payoﬀ wi (M) − εI{M 6=N} to player i, it
must be that i makes a proposal χi 6= M with a non-zero probability, and receives at least this payoﬀ in
expectation. However, since M will be the URC with probability 1 under σ∗ and it is not reached in one
round of elimination, when the proposal χi is accepted, it must be that the payoﬀ to player i must take a
value less than or equal to wi (M)− εI{M 6=N} − ε < wi (M)− εI{M 6=N}. Therefore, χi 6=M (not proposing
M) for i ∈ M cannot be part of any SWDE σ∗. This argument establishes that whenever i ∈ M is picked
by Nature at j = 0, the proposal of M will be made and will be accepted with probability 1. Now suppose
that Nature picks i0,q /∈ M as the proposer before any i ∈ M . Note that at stage j = 0, such i0,q /∈ M
can be picked as the proposer at most |N | − |M | times. Thus, after at most |N | − |M | votes against the
proposals, some i0 ∈ M will be picked as the proposer. Then the same argument as above establishes that
in any SWDE σ∗ all i ∈ M must vote n˜ with probability 1 to the proposal by any i0,q /∈ M . This follows
since voting y˜ will lead to some payoﬀ udi < wi (M)− εI{M 6=N} for i ∈M . knowing that ultimately Nature
will pick some i0 ∈M at stage j = 0, and in any SWDE σ∗, i0 will propose M and all i ∈M will vote y˜ with
probability 1 to this proposal, voting n˜ to the proposal by i0,q /∈M has a payoﬀ wi (M)− εI{M 6=N} to each
i ∈ M . Therefore, in any SWDE σ∗, all proposals by i0,q /∈ M at stage j = 0 are rejected with probability
1 and M is proposed and emerges as the URC with probability 1, yielding each player i’s a payoﬀ given by
(7). This completes the proof of the induction step and proves that under Assumption 1, any SWDE σ∗ has
M = φ (N) as the URC with probability 1, it is reached after at most one round of elimination, and players’
payoﬀs are given by (7). This completes the proof of Theorem 2. ¥
Proof of Theorem 3.
The proof is by induction on |N |. The base, |N | = 1, is trivial: in this case, φ (N) = 1, whereas the
two feasible allocations are xi = 0 and xi = 1, where i is the only player. Evidently, the latter is the core
allocation, because both may be enforced by coalition N . This proves the base of the induction; now suppose
that we have proved Theorem 3 for all coalition sizes less than n; let us prove it for any coalition N with
|N | = n.
For any X ⊂ N , let xX be the allocation given by
xXi =
⎧
⎨
⎩
wi (X) if i ∈ X;
0 otherwise.
(Note that such allocation xX may well be not feasible.)
First, take any core allocation x, then x+ ⊂ N is the set of players receiving positive payoﬀ. Clearly,
x+ 6= ∅, for otherwise coalitionN would deviate to xN (it is feasible because of Definition 9), and all members
of N would be better oﬀ. Moreover, x+ is a winning coalition (γx+ > αγN ), for otherwise γx0 ≥ (1− α) γN ,
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and then non-empty coalition x0 would be able to deviate to the same allocation xN , making each member
of x0 better oﬀ.
Given this, Definition 9 implies that either xi = wi (N) for all i ∈ N , or, by the induction hypothesis,
x+ ∈ φ (Y ) for some Y ⊂ N , Y 6= N (so x+ is self-enforcing), and xi = wi (x+).
Now suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that x+ /∈ φ (N). Take coalition X ∈ φ (N). We have that
γx+ > γX , because x+ is winning within N and is either self-enforcing or equal to N . But then the winning
coalition X can make all its members better oﬀ by choosing xX , which is feasible because either X = N , or
X 6= N and
X ∈ C
³
Γ˜ (X, γ|X , α, vX (·))
´
by induction. In particular, in this case, player i ∈ X ∩ x+ would obtain wi (X) > wi (x+), since γx+ > γX ,
while player i ∈ X \ x+ = X ∩ x0 would receive wi (X) > 0 = w−i . Therefore, coalition X has a feasible
deviation that makes all its members better oﬀ, contradicting the hypothesis that x+ /∈ φ (N) may be a
core allocation. This contradiction establishes that x is a core allocation. Moreover, if x+ = N , Definition
9 implies that x = xN , and xi = wi (N). If, on the other hand, x+ 6= N , then x|Y is a core allocation in
the game Γ˜ (Y, γ|Y , α, vX (·)) for some Y ∈ P (N) such that x+ ⊂ Y . But then by induction for any i ∈ x+,
we have xi = wi (x+). We have therefore proved that in any core allocation, the set of players receiving a
positive payoﬀ must constitute a coalition belonging to φ (N).
To complete the induction step, take any M ∈ φ (N). Both if M = N and if M 6= N , xM (satisfying
xMi = wi (M) for i ∈ M and xMi = 0 for i 6= M) is feasible (if M 6= N this follows from the induction
hypothesis). We will now prove that this is a core allocation. Suppose not. Then there exists coalition X
and allocation x0 enforced by coalition X that makes all members of X better oﬀ. This implies that x0i > 0
for all i ∈ X (if x0i = 0, then xMi ≥ 0 = x0i and would contradict the fact that i is better oﬀ). So, X ⊂ (x0i)
+.
If (x0i)
+
= N , then it γX ≥ (1− α) γN (otherwise, X would not be able to enforce x0), then M ∩X 6= ∅.
Take any player i ∈M ∩X, and note that for such a player i, we have
xMi = wi (M)
≥ wi (N)
= x0i.
This contradicts the fact that all members of coalition X are strictly better oﬀ by switching to x0. Now
consider the case (x0i)
+ 6= N . Since (x0i)+ 6= ∅, there exists Y ⊂ N , Y 6= N , such that x0 ⊂ Y and x0|Y is
the core allocation for Γ˜Y = Γ˜ (Y, γ|Y , α, vY (·)). By induction, x0i = wi
³
(x0)+
´
if i ∈ (x0)+. For x0 to be
enforceable, X must be a winning (within N) coalition. But since all members of X are better oﬀ, we have
that X ⊂ (x0)+, so (x0)+ is also winning within N . By induction, (x0)+ ∈ φ (Y ), so (x0)+ ∈ φ
³
(x0)+
´
. In
other words, (x0)+ is winning and self-enforcing, therefore, γ(x0)+ ≥ γM (because M ∈ φ (Y )). Both X and
M are winning, therefore, there exists i ∈M ∩X, and we have
xMi = wi (M)
≥ wi
³
(x0)+
´
= x0i.
This implies that i ∈ X does not prefer to switch to x0, yielding a contradiction. Therefore, xM is a core
allocation.
We next prove that it is the only core allocation satisfying x+ =M . Suppose, to obtain a contradiction,
that there is another allocation x. This allocation, x, must satisfy xi = wi (x+) if i ∈ x+, and xi = 0 if
i /∈ x+, which means x = xM . Therefore, the specified core allocation is unique.
This completes the proof of the induction step, which proves the one-to-one correspondence between
core allocations and coalitions from φ (N). If Assumption 1 holds, then φ (N) is a singleton by Theorem 1.
If φ (N) = {M}, then, as we have proved, xM is a core allocation, moreover, any core allocation is xM , and¡
xM
¢+
=M is unique. This completes the proof of Theorem 3. ¥
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